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Martin H. Malin** and Charles Taylor Kerchner*** 
I. Introduction 
Charter schools are in fashion.1 Once the darling of the right wing, they are being 
embraced by educational reformers of all stripes.  For the most part, however, the teacher union 
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1 Since the first charter school was founded in Minnesota in 1992, charters have been formed throughout the country. 
 By 2005, there were nearly 3,600 charter schools in 40 states and the District of Columbia, enrolling more than 1 
million students. See Center for Education Reform, All About Charter Schools, 
http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=document&documentID=1964 (visited Mar. 11, 2006).  Charters 
can be found at all grade levels, and generally their students are racially and economically similar to those in nearby 
traditional public schools.  As See Education Week’s briefing notes: “Although they serve only a tiny fraction of the 
nation’s public school students, charter schools have seized a prominent role in education today. They are at the 
center of a growing movement to challenge traditional notions of what public education means.” Charter Schools,
EDUC. WK. http://www.edweek.org/rc/issues/charter-schools/. (visited Mar. 11, 2006). 
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response ranges from outright opposition to reluctant and qualified acceptance2 The largely 
 
2 While the characterization of unions as opponents of charter schools is generally true, it is also the case that their 
position has moderated over the years and is quite nuanced.  In 2001, the National Education Association (NEA) 
abandoned its outright opposition to charters and replaced it with a series of conditions under which they could be 
accepted: 
• A charter should be granted only if the proposed school intends to offer an educational experience that is 
qualitatively different from what is available in traditional public schools.  
• Local school boards should have the authority to grant or deny charter applications; the process should be 
open to the public, and applicants should have the right to appeal to a state agency decisions to deny or 
revoke a charter.  
• Charter school funding should not disproportionately divert resources from traditional public schools.  
• Charter schools should be monitored on a continuing basis and should be subject to modification or closure 
if children or the public interest is at risk.  
• Private schools should not be allowed to convert to public charter schools, and private for-profit entities 
should not be eligible to receive a charter.  
• Charter schools should be subject to the same public sector labor relations statutes as traditional public 
schools, and charter school employees should have the same collective bargaining rights as their 
counterparts in traditional public schools.   
NEA’s Policy on Charter Schools, http://www.nea.org/charter/index.html (visited Mar. 11, 2006).. 
Meanwhile, NEA and American Federation of Teachers (AFT) locals have begun operating charter schools 
themselves in Houston, Dallas, and New York City.  In New York City, the United Federation of Teachers operates 
one charter school and plans to open another. See Erik Robelen, UFT Head Tells Charter Leaders: Teachers’ 
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negative reaction from organized labor to charter schools is understandable as some of the 
loudest advocates of charter schools are equally loud in their condemnation of labor unions, 
particularly unions that represent teachers.3
Unions Are Not Your Foe, EDUC. WK., Nov. 2, 2005, at 13.  The NEA has also allocated $1.5-million toward union 
organizing of charters. See Ann Bradley, Peer-Review Programs Catch Hold as Unions, Districts Work Together,
EDUC. WK., June 3, 1998, at 1.  
In December 2005, the Ohio Supreme Court heard arguments in a suit brought by the state Parent Teacher 
Association and strongly supported by the Ohio Federation of Teachers and other unions.  Essentially, the argument 
concerns the definition of “public” as applied to education.  The plaintiffs’ lawyer argued, “It’s not a public school if 
it’s administered by private entities, if it’s managed by a for-profit corporation, and I think that is the key.”  The 
attorney for the private school organizations countered, “These schools carry every indicia of a public entity.  They 
don’t discriminate.  They hire state-certified teachers.  They’re publicly funded.  They don’t charge tuition.  There’s 
no entrance exams.  And I think most importantly, they’re nonsectarian.” Erik Roblen, Ohio Supreme Court to Rule 
on Charter Laws, EDUC. WK., Dec. 7, 2005, at 25, 27.   
3See Leo Casey, Who’s Afraid of Teacher Voice? Charter Schools and Union Organizing, EDWIZE NEWS & OPINION,
Nov. 17, 2005,  http://edwize.org/whos-afraid-of-teacher-voice-charter-schools-and-union-organizing (visited Mar. 
11, 2006) (recounting actions of Atlantic Legal Foundation and quoting Norman Atkins of Uncommon Schools, 
“[G]ood charter schools organize themselves in ways that keep unions out.”);  Matt Cox, Children v. Unions,
NATIONAL REV. ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-cox091703.asp
(visited Aug. 9, 2006) (“Despite their rhetoric, teacher unions place power and money above the welfare of students. 
 They are part of a reactionary establishment that sees schools as a giant sinecure rather than something that exists to 
benefit children.  Battling well-heeled unions every time a charter school opens is no boon to reformers or the kids 
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 In this article, we confront the question of whether charter schools and collective 
bargaining are compatible.  In Part II, we consider the various rationales that have been offered 
for charter schools.  We comment on the notions that charter schools will break the public school 
monopoly, thereby injecting free market mechanisms for the betterment of all schools; reduce 
school size to more manageable levels; free schools up from bureaucracy and regulation; provide 
teachers with increased psychological purchase, and increase diversity in approaches to 
education. A key factor behind the growth of charter schools, we observe, is the view that public 
schools have failed. 
In Part III, we examine the role of employee relations in charter schools.  We contrast the 
model of the high performance workplace with the traditional industrial workplace.  We observe 
that the traditional industrial relations model dominates public schools and fuels the view that 
charter schools are anti-union because they are intended to break from that mold. 
In Part IV, we ask whether charter schools are inherently anti-union.  Implicit in the view 
that charter schools are anti-union is the view that teacher unions are guardians of a failed status 
quo and key obstacles to reform.  In contrast to this view, we relate examples where teacher 
unions have served as agents of change and teachers have shared in the risks of the educational 
enterprise.  We observe, however, that these examples are the exception and ask why the 
 
they want to help.”)see also David W. Kirkpatrick, Organizing Charter Schools, A Challenge to Unions, THE 
BUCKEYE INSTITUTE VIEWPOINT ON PUBLIC ISSUES, June 5, 2006, at http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/article/690
(viewed Aug. 10, 2006). 
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traditional industrial relations model continues to dominate public schools that collectively 
bargain with their teachers.  We look to conventional labor law doctrine as developed in the 
private sector and imported to the public sector to explain why.  We show that, encouraged by 
legal doctrine, most teacher unions and school districts have internalized the traditional industrial 
relations model. 
In Part V, we focus on the implications for charter schools.  We examine the application 
of existing legal doctrine to charter schools.  First we focus on the fundamental question of 
which law governs charter schools’ labor relations – the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4
or state law.  We next consider the diversity of approaches taken by the states to regulation of 
charter school labor relations.  However, we find that all of these approaches operate in a 
traditional industrial relations framework that is incompatible with the promise of charter schools 
as high performance, high involvement workplaces.  Accordingly, we propose to free charter 
schools up from traditional labor law doctrine and develop a labor law for charter schools.  In 
Part VI, we describe the basis for a new approach to providing for teacher voice in charter 
schools, and in Part VII we conclude that the approach will help resolve the tension between risk 
and reward for charter school teachers and between authority and responsibility for those who 
sponsor those schools.   
 
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (2000). 
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II. Why Charter Schools 
The movement for charter schools has been fueled by the beliefs that public schools have 
failed and that at least part of the reason they have failed is because of their monopoly on 
providing education.5 Charter schools thus serve as agents that break the monopoly of traditional 
public schools.  They offer alternatives that empower parental choice in their children's 
education.  Furthermore, by placing competitive pressures on traditional public schools, charters 
shock traditional schools out of their complacency and force them to change for the better, or so 
the argument goes. 
Charter schools have been described as the idea that everyone likes.  They have bipartisan 
support, and charter advocates can be found among free market economists, civil rights leaders, 
religious fundamentalists, advocates for the poor, and public educators.6 Such broad support is 
possible because the charter school structure brings together three important motivations: the 
revolt against bureaucratization, the introduction of choice or market mechanisms in public 
 
5 See Joe Nathan, Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education (1996); R. Craig 
Sautter,. Charter Schools: A New Breed of Public Schools (1993); James N. Goenner, Charter Schools: The 
Revitalization of Public Education, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 78 32-36 (1996); Chris Pipho, The Evolving Charter 
School Movement, 78 Phi Delta Kappan  489-90 (1997).
6 JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE CHARTER SCHOOL 
MOVEMENT 11 (2002). 
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schooling, and increasing teacher professionalism.7
Albert Shanker was not the first person to advocate charter schools.  That distinction  
belongs to Ray Budde, in  a report entitled Education by Charter: Restructuring School 
Districts.8 But Shanker, the late president of the American Federation of Teachers, popularized 
the idea in a 1988 speech before the National Press Club and two subsequent New York Times 
columns.9 Shanker lauded the charter school idea as “a new kind of school governance 
framework under which successful teachers would become ‘empowered’ to create innovative 
programs at existing schools-but only with the express approval of their union.”10  Taken one step 
further, charter schools, as originally conceived, would become places where teachers would be 
recognized as experts and, given the freedom to follow their own educational visions, would 
surely make schools better places for teachers to teach and more effective environments for 
students to learn.11  From Shanker’s perspective, it was the system, not the teachers, that was 
responsible for the failure of American public schools.  By breaking the grip of the system, more 
satisfied teachers would, in turn, mean better schools—which in turn would result in better 
 
7 See LIANE BROUILLETTE, CHARTER SCHOOLS: LESSONS IN SCHOOL REFORM (2002). 
8 RAY BUDDE, EDUCATION BY CHARTER: RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL DISTRICTS: KEYS TO LONG-TERM CONTINUING 
IMPROVEMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1988).
9 See MURPHY & SHIFFMAN, supra note ___, at 24. 
10  KRISTINA BERGER & PETER W. COOKSON, EXPECT MIRACLES: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE POLITICS OF HOPE AND 
DESPAIR 33-34 (2003). 
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students.12 However, in application, the original idea of charter schools as a community of 
professionals changed to a much more managerially driven organization.  
As Bulkley and Fisler summarize, early charter school advocates predicted five beneficial 
outcomes:   
1.   Charter schools would lead to the creation of new schools or the reinvention of old ones, 
and these would increase the choices available to parents. 
2. Charter schools would lead to more autonomy and flexibility than district-operated 
schools because they would have waivers of law and regulation. Some 29 of the 37 states 
with charter school legislation include the intent to “facilitate innovative teaching,” and in 
24 states charter schools were designed to “create professional development opportunities 
for teachers.”  
3. The interplay of autonomy and market forces would make charter schools more 
innovative and of higher quality than conventional schools “in the areas of instruction and 
curriculum, school organization and governance, and in some cases alter teacher 
qualification and union involvement.”  
4. Charter schools would be more accountable because they had to meet market demands in 
the short run and performance contract expectations in the long run. 





student achievement, high parent and student satisfaction, high teacher/employee 
satisfaction and empowerment, positive effects on the broader system of public education 
and positive or neutral effects on educational equity, including better services for at-risk 
students.”13 
The reality of the first decade of widespread charter school use has fallen short of 
glowing expectations but also does not support categorical rejection of the model.  Detractors 
point toward serious equity and accountability issues.14 Performance comparisons have not 
shown charters to be substantially more effective than comparable public schools.  Recent 
reviews of student achievement found the evidence mixed or slightly positive.15 The first 
nationwide comparison, using data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress, found 
charters either showing no positive difference when compared to traditional public schools or 
lagging significantly behind them in math and reading scores.16 
13 Katrina Bulkley, & Jennifer Fisler, A Decade of Charter Schools: From Theory to Practice 2 (CPRE Policy Briefs 
RB-35, 2002) (Available as ERIC ED466 567), available at http://www.cpre.org/Publications/rb35.pdf. 
14 See, e.g., AMY STUART WELLS, BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CHARTER SCHOOL REFORM: A STUDY OF TEN 
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1998). 
15 See B. P. GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS (2001); GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER NELSON, STUDENT ACADEMIC 
ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY WE KNOW SO LITTLE (2001) (hereinafter MIRON 
& NELSON, STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT).    
16 See Diana Jean Schemo,. Charter Schools Trail in Results, U.S. Data Reveals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17 2004, at A-1. 
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In 2002, Bulkley reviewed the characteristics and performance of charter schools.17 She 
found that comprehensive evaluation of charter schools is difficult to for several reasons.  
“Charter schools differ considerably from state to state and district to district.”18 Thus the 
“charter school” label says relatively little about how the school is operated, the degree of 
freedom it has, or the socioeconomics of its students.   Although this is changing as charter 
schools gain more experience, Bulkley found that they tended to be too new to have established 
track records, had unstable or different enrollments than corresponding public schools, and used 
different assessment methods that frequently varied annually.19 “In addition,” Bulkley wrote, 
“the quality of research varies considerably: some studies have exercised considerable effort to 
 
The comparative data only came to light after researchers at the American Federation of Teachers provided an 
analysis to the New York Times. The AFT report also documented the long delay in releasing charter school results 
and the intention to reanalyze the data to explain the apparent weakness of charters. F. HOWARD NELSON ET AL., 
CHARTER SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT ON THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS (2004).  Federal 
officials said that they had not intended to hide the performance of charter schools, which the government supports 
as an alternative to traditional public schools Schemo, supra. The event occasioned a spate of charge and counter 
charge about the efficacy of charter schools. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, The2004 Campaign: Student Scores: 
Education Secretary Defends Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2004, at A-18. 




use appropriate controls and make suitable comparisons, while others have been less cautious.” 20 
Bulkley continued, “It is thus not surprising that a recent review of student achievement in 
charter schools by RAND researchers found that ‘…evidence on the academic effectiveness of 
charter schools is mixed.’”21  “Similarly, the most comprehensive analysis of findings on charter 
school achievement concluded ‘the charter impact on student achievement appears to be mixed 
or, very slightly positive.’”22 
Miron and Nelson reviewed 15 studies and classified them according to the strength of 
charter school impact, either positive or negative, and the quality of the study itself. 23 When 
they considered only the highest quality studies, those from Arizona, Texas, Connecticut 
suggested positive impacts while those from Michigan and the District of Columbia found 
negative effects.  “The overall conclusion remains that the evidence of charter schools’ impact on 
student achievement is mixed.”24 
A major factor in the success or failure of charter schools will be the schools' 
relationships with their teachers.  The next Part examines the role of employment relations in 
 
20 Id. (citing MIRON & NELSON, AUTONOMY IN EXCHANGE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, supra, note _____;  LEWIS SOLMON 
ET AL., DOES CHARTER SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IMPROVE TEST SCORES? THE ARIZONA RESULTS (2001)). 
21 Id. (quoting  GILL ET AL., supra note ___, at 95). 
22 Id. (quoting  MIRON & NELSON, STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT, supra note ___, at 1). 
23 MIRON & NELSON, STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT, supra note ___, at 24. 
24 Id. at 25. 
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charter schools.  
 III. Employment Relations and Charter Schools 
Charter schools are envisioned as high performance workplaces.  As observed earlier, 
former AFT President Albert Shanker advocated charter schools as vehicles for empowering 
teachers to take charge of student learning by freeing them from bureaucratic constraints.  This 
part explores charter schools as high performance workplaces, contrasts that with the traditional 
industrial union model of employment relations and explores the view that charter schools are 
anti-union. 
A. Charter Schools as High Performance Workplaces 
Traditional workplace organizations were characterized by a hierarchy with leadership 
from the top down in a style Bradford and Cohen have termed the heroic manager.25 In this 
model, the manager knows at all times everything that is going on in his or her department, has 
more expertise than any subordinate, is able to solve any problem that arises before any 
subordinate can, and is the primary, if not exclusive, person responsible for how the department 
is working.26 In this command and control system, subordinates are not expected to think 
creatively but instead are confined to carrying out specifically and narrowly assigned tasks.27  
25 See DAVID L. BRADFORD & ALLAN R. COHEN, MANAGING FOR EXCELLENCE: THE LEADERSHIP GUIDE TO 
DEVELOPING HIGH PERFORMANCE IN CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS (1997). 
26 Id. at 10 - 11. 
27 See, e.g., George Nesterczuk et al., Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 
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In contrast, a high performance workplace emphasizes flexibility, employee involvement, 
responsibility and accountability and an incentive system of rewards.    There is frequently a 
strong emphasis on workforce training and on flexibility in organizational structure.28 Managers 
share decision-making responsibility with workers often organized into functional teams.  
Managers function more like coaches, facilitators and integrators.29 Bradford and Cohen refer to 
this model as the manager as developer.30 
Charter schools are envisioned as providing a high performance alternative to 
traditionally bureaucratized, top-down public school systems.  The most striking characteristic of 
charter schools is their small size, 137 students on average compared to 475 in district schools.31  
Most states allow charters considerable autonomy.  About half allow them to waive state law and 
 
1404 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=4
941 (visited Mar. 11, 2006) (critiquing Clinton Administration partnership counsels and arguing that federal civil 
servants’ role is confined to following directions to implement policies established by political appointees). 
28 See Susan Parks, Improving Workplace Performance: Historical and Theoretical Contexts, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
May 1995, at 18, 19. 
29 See Martha A. Gephart & Mark E. Van Buren, Building Synergy: The Power of High Performance Work Systems,
50 TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT, Oct. 1996, at 21, 22. 
30 See BRADFORD & COHEN, supra note ___, at 61. 
31 RPI INTERNATIONAL,. THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: 2000, at 46 (2000).  
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regulations,32 although states vary substantially in what powers are granted to the schools.  
Generally, charters authorized by agencies other than a local school district have more autonomy 
than those that operate within a district framework, and those operated by private educational 
management organization.33 
Clearly charters are governed and managed differently from traditional public schools, 
although there is no single model.   Some schools are “out-sourced” to profit making or non-
profit organizations.  Some are teacher-led, with no traditional management structure.  Some 
have strong boards.  Some have strong charismatic principals.  Some are literally producers’ 
cooperatives in which the teachers have an ownership stake in their own professional practice.34 
The most striking example of teacher ownership occurs in Minnesota, where a teacher-owned 
site-based management company, EdVisions Cooperative, contracts to run eight small schools.35 
The experiment with teacher-run schools has spread to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where eight 
schools were designed to move beyond a “grievance-based culture.”36 The teachers remain 
employees of the Milwaukee Public Schools and subject to the collective bargaining agreement 
 
32 Id. 
33 Bulkley, & Fisler, supra note ___, at 3. 
34 See generally EDWARD J. DIRKSWAGER, TEACHERS AS OWNERS: A KEY TO REVITALIZING PUBLIC EDUCATION 
(2002). 
35 See id. at 87-88. 
36 Lynne Sobczak, MPS "Teacher Cooperatives" Make List of top 50 Innovations 1 (Milwaukee Public Schools 
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for wages and benefits.  But their schools are a workers’ cooperatives, both organizationally and 
legally.  The teachers develop their own work rules. 
It is also clear that teacher work is different in charter schools, both in terms of the 
conditions under which it takes place and the content of the jobs.  “Charter schools, overall, 
possess a fair amount of freedom to determine salaries and working agreements for teachers,” 
Malloy and Wohlstetter observe in a summary of charter school working conditions and their 
appeal as workplaces.37 In 17 states charter schools are not bound by district collective 
bargaining agreements and in 11 states the bargaining provisions depend on the type of charter 
school involved.38 
Charter schools seem to be more attractive to teachers, who are largely satisfied with their 
work, and less secure and protected than teachers in public schools.  In terms of teacher 
compensation, most studies report charter school teachers earning about what they would have 
had they been teaching in the public schools.39 However, there appears to be more variability in 
teacher salary than would be the case in traditional public schools.  Salary studies of charter 
school teachers reveal that about one-third reported higher salaries than would have been the case 
 
2006). 
37 Courtney L Malloy & Priscilla Wohlstetter, Working Conditions in Charter Schools: What is the Appeal for 
Teachers, 35 EDUC. & URBAN SOC. 219, 223 (2003). 
38 See infra pt. V. 
39 See Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at 224. 
-16- 
in regular public schools.40 In a 9-state study, some 38% said that they were being paid less than 
they would have been paid in the public schools,41 and in another national study 20% reported 
having a lower salary than in their previous public school position.42 Whether charter school 
teachers make more or less than those in traditional public schools apparently also varies by state. 
 A study of beginning teacher salaries in Arizona showed that the salary range was $8,000 in 
conventional public schools and $21,000 in charters.43 
Pay is also structured differently.  The National Center for Education Statistics reveals 
that only 62% of charter schools reported using salary schedules compared with nearly all 
traditional public schools.44 New charters are less likely to use salary schedules than those 
schools that have been converted from traditional schools. Podgursky and Ballou note that 46% 
of charter schools report that they use some kind of merit pay and 37% offer bonuses for teachers 
with subject matter specialties that are in short supply.45 
Charter school jobs are much less secure than those in traditional public schools.  Some 
 
40 See Julia E.Koppich et al., New Rules, New Roles?  The Professional Work Lives of Charter School Teachers 30 
(1998). 
41 See Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at 224. 
42 KOPPICH ET AL, supra note ___, at 30. 
43 Lewis Soloman, Teacher Accountability in Charter Schools Conservative News Service(Mach 1,999), available at 
www.cnsnews.org/Education/archive/EDU199990301b.html. 
44 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, EDUCATION STATISTICS QUARTERLY, Fall 2002, at 10. 
45 MICHAEL PODGURSKY & DALE BALLOU, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN CHARTER SCHOOLS 17(2001). 
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charter schools use employment-at-will contracts, and only 34% of charter school teachers report 
that they hold tenure.46 Tenure is much more common among teachers in schools that have been 
converted from traditional schools than in new charters.47  
Charter school teachers also work longer.  A California study showed that charter schools 
operated 183 school days compared to 175 for traditional schools.48 Other studies reported 
similar comparisons.49  Johnson and Landrum suggested that longer hours derived from strong 
norms of work completion rather than specified start and quit times.50 
Charter school teachers are younger than their public school counterparts, a fact that may 
simply reflect the start-up nature of these organizations.  In a Michigan study, Harris and Plank 
found that nearly 57% of charter school teachers had less than four years experience compared to 
14% in a matched sample of teachers in traditional public schools.51 
46 KOPPICH ET AL, supra note ___, at 29. 
47 Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at. 225. 
48 JUDITH POWELL ET AL., SRI INTERNATIONAL, EVALUATION OF CHARTER SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS PART I (Dec. 11, 
1997), available at www.lao.ca.gov/1997/121197_charter_schools/sri_charter_schools_1297-part1.html (visited 
Aug. 10, 2006). 
49 See Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at. 227. 
50 S. M. Johnson and J. Landrum, Sometimes Bureaucracy Has Its Charms: The Working Conditions of Teachers in 
Deregulated Schools, 102 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 85, 86 (2000). 
51 DEBBI HARRIS & DAVID PLANK, WHO’S TEACHING IN MICHIGAN’S TRADITIONAL AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 3 
(Education Policy Center at Michigan State Univ. 2003). 
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Given these data, one would naturally ask, as did Malloy and Wohlstetter, “why are 
teachers attracted to charter schools.”52 Charter school teachers, particularly, seem to like the 
freedom and flexibility their workplaces offer.  Most state statutes provide charter schools the 
ability to pick their own curriculum and instructional methods, this at a time when the trend at 
traditional public schools is toward centralization and a prescriptive curriculum.  Virtually all the 
studies reviewed by Malloy and Wohlstetter showed that the freedom of individual practice was 
important.  Financial flexibility was also mentioned as an attraction.  Teachers reported having 
funds to purchase supplies of their own choosing and of having financial support to attend 
professional development events, and they liked the small size of the schools. 
Of at least equal importance, teachers were attracted to charter schools because they could 
work in an environment that supported a pedagogy and philosophy of education they believed in. 
 The motivational power of a common educational belief system is quite strong.  In their case 
study research Malloy and Wohlstetter found a teacher who had chosen to teach at a charter 
school because it was exempt from the district reading program.53 But they also found that the 
question of freedom of action was not just individual, as illustrated by the following statement 
from one of the teachers they interviewed: “The charter is something that came from within us; it 
represents our school philosophy.  It is not lip service.  It stands for who we are as teachers and 
what we do.  We look at what we are doing, and we keep what works and change what 
 
52 See Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at 227. 
53 Malloy and Wohlstetter, supra note ___, at 231. 
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doesn’t.”54 In their case study sites, Malloy and Wohlstetter found that teachers valued 
collaboration and cooperation:  “They spoke of a ‘spirit of openness.’ In the urban charter 
schools we visited, teachers also valued the collaboration and cooperation they experienced.  One 
teacher noted, ‘In other schools, people are afraid to express their opinions, but here everyone’s 
opinion is valued.’” 55  
Another charter school teacher said, “Teachers are given an opportunity to share at our 
school.  If they have an idea they think will work, they share it.”  Teachers also reported 
they shared both formally and informally.  They shared successful strategies, classroom 
materials, and informative professional development strategies, classroom materials, and 
informative professional development offerings.  “There is a great deal of communication 
here.  People aren’t stingy about what takes place in their classrooms,” and ”There is a 
great deal of sharing among teachers…. Sharing is Number 1 here.”  One teacher at a 
conversion charter school described an “open door policy” and said, ”Informally, there is 
a lot of exchange.  Our doors are always open, and people just drop in.  There’s not a 
sense of ownership here; we’re into sharing.”56 
Interpersonal and informal sharing, however, differs from creating a self-managing 
organization or a worker’s cooperative.  In their survey of the literature, Murphy and Shiffman 
 
54 Id.at 232. 
55 Id. at 233. 
56 Id. 
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report that teachers generally felt that they had high quality and professional workplaces.57 
However, in our reading, “professional” appears to mean freedom to teach as one wishes and to 
innovate in the classroom rather than involvement in school operations and management. 
Teachers in a National Education Association sponsored survey said that they were substantially 
involved in decision making about teacher hiring and assignment, curriculum development, and 
the content of their professional development.  “The vast majority report that they have little or 
no say in hiring school administrators or determining how money is allocated at their schools.”58  
Some studies show increased teacher empowerment; other show less 59 
Despite these variances in the degree of teacher involvement in management operations, 
charter schools are perceived as bastions of teacher empowerment in contrast to highly 
bureaucratized traditional public schools.  The latter most often follow the traditional industrial 
labor relations model to which we now turn. 
B. Traditional Public Schools and the Industrial Labor Relations Model 
In his classic work, Industrial Relations Systems, John Dunlop identified the core 
elements on an industrial relations system: 
Every industrial relations system involves three groups of actors: (1) workers and their 
organizations, (2) managers and their organizations, and (3) governmental agencies 
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58 See KOPPICH ET AL., supra note ___, at 35.   
59 MURPHY & SHIFFMAN, supra note __, at173-74. 
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concerned with the work place and the work community.  Every industrial relations 
system creates a complex of rules to govern the work place and work community.  These 
rules may take a variety of forms in different systems – agreements, statutes, orders, 
decrees, regulations, awards, policies and practices and customs.  The form of the rule 
does not order its character: to define the status of the actors and to govern conduct of all 
actors at the work place and work community.60 
In the traditional industrial workplace, the status of the actors and the rules governing 
their conduct are rigidly set.  Management controls all decision making and employees’ functions 
are limited to carrying out the narrow tasks as directed by management.  Any notion of shared 
responsibility is anathema to principles of scientific management.  Summers has aptly described 
the phenomenon, “The predominant response of employers to . . . demands for industrial 
democracy was that owners were endowed by law, if not by God, with authority and 
responsibility to manage the business.  Insistence by workers for a voice in management 
decisions was a violation of property rights and the moral order.”61 
Collective bargaining thus is viewed as an inroad on inherent managerial authority.  
James Atelson described this view as follows: 
The notion that a set of inherent managerial prerogatives exists suggests a timeless 
historical imperative.  The language in NLRB and judicial opinions, not to mention 
 
60 JOHN T. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS viii (1958). 
61 Clyde Summers, Industrial Democracy: America’s Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 29, 30 (1979). 
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arbitration opinions where the characteristic is most easily observable, often appeals to a 
“Genesis” view of labor-management relations.  “In the beginning” there was 
management and some employees.  Management directed the enterprise until limited by 
law and collective bargaining agreements.  The power of an employer, then, is analogized 
to a state, having all powers not expressly or perhaps implicitly restricted in the state’s 
constitution.  Moreover, management would prefer that these restrictions be narrowly 
interpreted and limited to the express terms of the state’s constitution.62 
Collective bargaining’s inroads on absolute managerial authority are themselves limited 
by the inherent management rights model.  As the Supreme Court opined, “[I]n establishing what 
issues must be submitted to the process of collective bargaining, Congress had no expectation 
that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the 
business enterprise in which the union’s members are employed.  Despite the deliberate 
openendedness of the statutory language, there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which 
bargaining must take place.”63 Decisions concerning the operation of the enterprise, that is those 
that go to the “core of entrepreneurial control,”64 are left to the employer’s unilateral discretion, 
with the employees having a right to bargain only about the effects of those decisions on them.65 
62 JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 122 (1983). 
63 First Nat’l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S, 666, 676 (1981). 
64 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
65 See First Nat’l Maint., 452 U.S. at 686. 
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In other words, employees are not entitled to any voice in decisions that concern the risks of the 
enterprise.  Their right is to negotiate agreements that insulate them from the risks of decisions 
made unilaterally by management. 
Even the inroads that collective bargaining makes in protecting employees from 
management’s decisions are limited by the hierarchical nature of the traditional industrial 
relations model.  The dominant obligation of workers is to obey management’s commands.  
Indeed, insubordination is widely recognized as one of the most serious offenses a worker can 
commit, often justifying discharge without any prior resort to progressive discipline.  The 
rationale is directly related to hierarchical control.  “When a supervisor gives an order, there must 
be an expectation that it will be obeyed.  Without that expectation, the enterprise cannot function 
and survive.”66 Even if the directive violates the collective bargaining agreement, with limited 
exceptions, the worker is expected to obey the directive and seek redress through the contract’s 
grievance procedure.67 In other words, workers’ roles are to obey and not to think. 
Under the industrial model, workers who do think for themselves, that is those who 
exercise discretion and who have a voice in decisions affecting the operation of the enterprise, 
are not employees.  Rather, they are part of management.  In NLRB v. Yeshiva University,68 the 
 
66 Steven J. Goldsmith & Louis Shulman, Common Causes of Discipline, in 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION § 10.04 (Tim Bornstein et al., eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
67 See id. at § 16.04[3]; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1023 (Allen Miles Rubin ed., 6th ed. 2003). 
68 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
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Supreme Court held that because of the typical faculty governance system, university faculty are 
managers and therefore excluded from coverage under the NLRA.  Operating through various 
committees and faculty meetings, faculty are deeply involved in faculty recruitment and hiring, 
tenure, approvals of leave requests, setting the curriculum, admissions, retention and graduation 
requirements and similar decisions which the Court regarded as managerial. 69 
Higher education faculty who lack such faculty governance structures and are therefore 
covered by the NLRA might unionize and then bargain collectively for traditional faculty 
governance.  If they do so, they will find that they have bargained themselves out of statutory 
coverage.  In College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery,70 the faculty unionized and negotiated 
for a series of faculty committees dealing with curriculum, admissions, student promotion and 
evaluation, hiring, faculty rank and faculty promotions.  The NLRB held that the faculty had 
become managers.  The Board reasoned, “The Yeshiva decision does not expressly or impliedly 
distinguish situations in which managerial authority was granted through collective bargaining 
from situations in which such authority was more freely granted and we do not believe that such 
a distinction is required by the Act.”71 Similarly, in University of Dubuque,72 in finding the 
 
69 The determination of whether a particular college’s faculty are employees or managers requires a highly fact 
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faculty to be managers, the Board relied, in part, on provisions in the faculty collective 
bargaining agreement which gave the faculty the exclusive right to set student grading and 
classroom conduct standards, set degree requirements, recommend degree recipients, recommend 
new course offerings, recommend admissions standards and recommend department staffing 
needs. 
No state has applied Yeshiva to public schools, and the NLRB refused to apply Yeshiva to 
a private K-12 school for students with severe learning disabilities in Wordsworth Academy.73  
The Board distinguished Yeshiva based on the more limited role teachers at Wordsworth played 
in governance of the institution: 
While it is true that the faculty at Wordsworth exercise considerable discretion in some 
matters, this discretion does not extend beyond the routine performance of the tasks to 
which they have been assigned.  The teachers, working with the supervisors and guided 
by the goals set forth in the IEP, estimate the students' needs, design a suitable 
educational program, and  coordinate the details associated with completing those tasks.  
They examine the students' qualifications and disabilities and place them in an 
appropriate unit of the school; design courses suited to the needs of the students in the 
units; select appropriate teachers, times, and educational materials; assess student 
performance; and determine the proper direction for the students' future educational 
 
72 289 N.L.R.B. 349 (1988). 
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experience.  The total package is geared toward one narrow goal--remedying particular 
learning disabilities. The teachers act solely as professional special educators in creating 
and implementing this educational package.   
 Thus, unlike Yeshiva, the teachers at Wordsworth do not make recommendations 
to the administration in cases of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination, and 
promotion.  Nor is it true that the teachers make final decisions regarding the admission 
and expulsion of individual students.  The teachers offer their professional opinion as to 
whether the school can "help the child," but this is not in any way binding on the 
administration.  While the faculty at Yeshiva University "decided questions involving 
teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and enrollment levels..." the record 
reveals no role in these matters for the teachers at Wordsworth.  Also, unlike the faculty 
in Yeshiva, the teachers at Wordsworth work jointly with supervisory personnel to decide 
on the academic content of the school's educational program, and make the decisions 
under the guidelines established by the IEP.  Thus, the Employer's teachers play a 
diminished role in "determin[ing]... the product to be produced," and play no role in 
determining the "terms upon which [the product] will be offered, and the customers who 
will be served."  They are clearly no more than professional employees whose decision-
making is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they 
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have been assigned.74  
In other words, the teachers in Wordsmith were like the typical industrial workers.  They did not 
think for themselves.  Instead, they applied their professional expertise in the manners directed 
by their employer. 
The traditional industrial model dominates teacher collective bargaining today.  As 
described by Edward Dirkswager of the Center for Policy Studies,  
The typical organizational structure of our school system contains a rigid hierarchy of 
roles and decision-making power with teachers firmly positioned at the bottom of this 
hierarchy.  Very simply, teachers are employees, and like most employees in rigid 
hierarchical organizations, they have a limited range of decision-making powers.75 
Seventy percent of teachers feel left out of the decision making process.76 
Teacher unions do not have a voice in decision making concerning the nature or direction 
of the schools.  Instead, they negotiate contract provisions designed to protect the employees they 
represent form the risks of management decision making.  They negotiate salary schedules that 
eliminate all discretion in the fixing of base pay.  Salary becomes a mechanical function of a 
teacher’s educational level and length of service.  They do not negotiate what extra curricular 
activites will be offered but instead negotiate how staff for the activities management decides to 
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offer will be selected and what they will be paid.  They negotiate for fringe benefits and how 
teachers will be selected for reductions in force but do not negotiate decisions that may result in 
or prevent the need to reduce force.  They negotiate the length or their work day and whether they 
will have duty free lunch and preparation periods but do not negotiate curriculum or methods of 
instruction. 
C. The Industrial Model, Teacher Unions and Charter Schools 
Teachers are one of the most highly unionized groups of workers in the United States.  
Although precise statistics on teacher unionization rates nationally are not available, the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reports that in 2003, 37.7% of all workers employed in the education, training 
and library professions were union members and 42.3% were represented by a union.77 
Similarly, in 2003, 42.6% of workers employed by local government (a classification that 
includes pubic school districts) were union members and 46.7% were represented by a union in 
2003.78 
More than a decade ago, a union official offered up the following prediction about charter 
schools.  “I think I know how this is going to work out,” he said.  “We’ll fight charter schools 
tooth and nail; then after we lose, we’ll figure out that we can organize the teachers who teach in 
them.”  Yet, the industrial model of collective bargaining that dominates public school teacher 
 




labor relations, on its face, appears incompatible with the vision of the charter school as a high 
performance workplace, a vision that attracts teachers to charter schools.79 
Therefore, it is not surprising that teachers in charter schools are far more ambivalent to 
union representation than their peers in traditional public schools.  In a survey of 232 charter 
school teachers in eight states, Koppich, et al. found them satisfied with their work, but not 
perceiving that the teacher’s union had much influence over it or much relevance to their 
professional work lives.80 Only 24 percent of teachers indicated that the local teacher’s union or 
associations was actively involved in establishing teacher working conditions and school 
operating rules.81  In state-by-state breakouts, a higher percentage of teachers in California (44%) 
and Wisconsin (40%) said that their local union was involved, but in Arizona, Colorado, 
Massachusetts, Michigan and Minnesota upwards of 85% said there was no union involvement in 
their working conditions.82   
Charter schools emphasize the battle that teacher unions face for the hearts and minds of 
their own membership.  Existing polls done by unions themselves show substantial differences 
between young and veteran teachers in what they expect from their union.  Older teachers tend 
toward wanting their unions to engage in traditional pocketbook issues and job protection, that is 
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to follow the traditional industrial labor relations model and protect them from the risks posed by 
management decision making. Younger teachers want help with the problems they face in 
teaching.83 In the case of charter school teachers, however, these differences extend to their 
identification with the union altogether.   
In the next part, we address whether teacher collective bargaining and high performance 
educational workplaces are incompatible.  We also address the role of the law in promoting 
traditional labor relations in public education and in inhibiting the development of high 
performance workplaces. 
IV. Teacher Collective Bargaining and High Performance Workplaces 
 The dominant approach to teacher labor relations follows the traditional industrial 
relations model.  However, there are exceptions where teachers, through their unions, have 
shared in the risks of the enterprise.  Such sharing comes with a voice in decision making that 
recognizes teachers are something more than worker drones who mechanically carry out the 
directives of management.  In Section A, we discuss examples of these exceptional cases.  In 
Section B, we analyze why these examples are the exceptions rather than the rule, focusing our 
analysis on the role of legal doctrine. 
A. Teacher Unions as Agents of Change: The Exceptional Cases 
Although the traditional industrial labor relations model dominates teacher collective 
bargaining, there is nothing inherent in the teacher - school district relationship that mandates 
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this.  There are a number of notable examples where teachers and their unions have served as 
agents for change, investing in the future of the educational enterprise.  Case studies of individual 
districts and review articles illustrate a broadened scope of bargaining and a rich set of informal 
relationships between union and districts.84 Both national unions have reformers and 
traditionalists.  The American Federation of Teachers has been more explicit about reforms and 
now calls itself “a union of professionals.”  During the presidency of Bob Chase (1996-2002) the 
National Education Association actively pushed “the new unionism”, but old unionists pushed 
back and reform ideas have been marginalized.  Factions of the NEA found Chase's ideas 
treasonable. The leaders of Wisconsin's largest affiliates wrote: "Your remarks are not only 
appalling, they ignore the fundamental strength of a union.  …We are union and we are proud; 
we stand in solidarity to defend against those who are attempting to destroy us."85 The Teacher 
Union Reform Network (TURN), made up of locals from both the NEA and AFT, has been a 
forum for discussion and interaction among reformers.  The organization has met quarterly for 
more than a decade.86 Among TURN members and others, reforms have begun to focus 
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explicitly on increasing educational quality.  Innovation has begun to coalesce around a cluster of 
reforms that links four powerful elements—peer review, teacher induction, professional 
development, and compensation rewards—with an indicator system that shows whether and how 
students are achieving. 
The existence of educational standards and high quality indicators of how well students 
are doing is essential to linking discussions about the work of teachers and the performance of 
schools.  Although faulty in many ways, the federal No Child Left Behind Act87 has riveted 
educators’ attention to student outcome measurement.  Several school districts and teacher 
unions have consciously developed data analysis capacity at the school level.  Schools in the Los 
Angeles Annenberg Metropolitan Project have created data teams that analyze the disaggregated 
results of the Stanford 9 tests, the state's official accountability measure, and locally created 
indicators.88 And a coalition of schools in suburban Chicago have started comparing themselves 
with the best teachers in the highest scoring nations on the Third International Math and Science 
Study (TIMSS).89  They have spent five years looking at their results and understanding how their 
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teaching practices need to change to reach world-class levels. 
Since 1981, the Toledo Federation of Teachers and the Toledo Public Schools have 
jointly operated a peer review process, and the practice has spread to more than 30 districts 
nationwide.90 Peer review brings higher standards to teaching.  It significantly changes the 
conception of teaching work by recognizing the importance of engagement and commitment as 
well as skill and technique.  It recognizes a legitimate role for teachers in establishing and 
enforcing standards in their own occupation.91  
The Toledo experience is a sharp contrast to the traditional industrial labor relations 
model.  Under the traditional model, management exclusively evaluates employees, disciplines 
them, directs them to improve their performance, and dismisses them if they fail to improve.  The 
union protects the employee from management’s actions by grieving disciplinary action, 
ultimately challenging management to justify its actions in an adversarial arbitration proceeding 
or, in some cases, a statutory tenure dismissal hearing.  In Toledo, the union shares responsibility 
for developing the talents of new teachers and for identifying poorly performing tenured teachers, 
devising remediation strategies and separating those who do not improve from the district.  
 
90 See C.M.Waters & T.L. Wyatt, Toledo's Internship: The Teachers' Role in Excellence, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 365 
(1985). 
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July 1985, at 22.  
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Under peer review, the union's role balances protection of individual teachers with the protection 
of teaching.  As Albert Fondy, president of the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers notes, "a union 
is not conceived with the primary mission of protecting the least competent of its members."92  
In Toledo, the heart of the process is an Intern Board of Review (IBR), which has five 
union representatives and four district representatives.  (Other peer review districts have similar 
boards.)  New teachers are required to participate in a two-year intern program, where they work 
with consulting teachers on mutual goal setting and detailed follow-up conferences based on 
detailed observations.  The IBR selects the consulting teachers who serve three year terms during 
which they are relieved from all classroom teaching responsibilities.93   
The IBR also runs an intervention program for non-probationary teachers whose 
performance is so far below acceptable standards that the only options are improvement or 
leaving the school system.  The teacher’s principal and the union building representative must 
agree to place a teacher in the intervention program.  A consulting teacher is assigned to the 
teacher in intervention, a plan for improvement is drawn up and the consulting teacher reports 
frequently to the IBR to justify actions taken and evaluate progress made.94   
Union-run peer review for elementary and secondary school teachers has produced a long 
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enough record that reasonable claims can be made for its success.  Started in Toledo, Ohio in 
1982, it has spread to about 30 other sites.95  Although no definitive list or comprehensive study 
exists, anecdotal evidence suggests that peer review provides a more thorough system of 
inducting and evaluating novices than that practiced in conventional settings.  Peer review also 
seems to be more effective than conventional administrative evaluation in remediation or 
removal of veteran teachers with serious performance problems. 
Although the sample size is too small to allow a broad statistical comparison, the 
historical evidence in such Ohio districts as Toledo and Columbus suggests that more 
probationary teachers were dismissed than under the previous system of administrative review.  
Between 1981 and 1997, 52 experienced teachers out of a population of about 2,600 in Toledo 
were thought to have such serious performance problems that peer intervention was necessary.  
All but 10 left the classroom.  About 10 percent of Toledo's intern teachers were not rehired for a 
second year of teaching.  In Columbus, 178 teachers out of a work force of 4,800 were placed in 
the district's negotiated intervention program between 1985 and 1997.  More than 40 percent 
returned to teaching in "good standing."  The others resigned, retired, or were terminated.  During 
the same period, 3,321 new teachers participated in the Columbus intern program with 7 percent 
receiving unsatisfactory ratings.96 
95 Walters & Wyatt, supra note ___. 
96 Ann Bradley, Peer-Review Programs Catch Hold As Unions, Districts Work Together, EDUC. WEEK, June 3 1998, 
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 Peer review provides much more formative assistance than conventional induction 
processes.  In every case we know of, the union bargained hard for funds to support the program. 
 Teachers have gone to the brink of strike to save their programs in Toledo (1995) and in 
Cincinnati (1999 and 2000). 
The cutting edge of peer review, of course, is the ability of supervising teachers to "call 
the question" (as they say in Rochester, New York) making a judgment about a novice's 
performance.  Unionists disagree about whether peer review is a proper union role.  Adam 
Urbanski, president of the Rochester (N.Y.) Teachers Association, is fond of saying "peer review 
is controversial in all the places that don't have it."  And he is largely correct.  Schools and 
unions that have adopted the system are largely happy with it even though administrative 
organizations frequently oppose the idea.  In Rochester, the administrators' union sued the 
teachers’ union and the district over the peer assistance and review program, claiming that 
allowing teachers to evaluate one another violated the rights of administrators.  The New York 
Supreme Court dismissed the suit.97 
Peer review can, of course, comprise part of an induction process and one of the ways that 
unions make teaching more attractive.  Several union locals, including those in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Miami-Dade County, Florida, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, have strong working relationships 
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with local universities that provide a pathway into teaching that is grounded in a school's 
classroom context and pedagogy and teaching internships.98 The program in Columbus, Ohio, 
works hand-in glove with the peer review program, with some of the supervising teachers also 
offering classes in the teacher education program offered through Ohio State University.99  
In Cincinnati, the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers, the University of Cincinnati, and the 
school district devised a substantial modification in teacher training based on their analysis of 
what is required to be an effective teacher in an urban setting.  The Cincinnati program includes a 
program in which prospective teachers study for two undergraduate majors, one in a discipline, 
and one in teaching.  They undertake an internship in their fifth year, and they work alongside 
senior teachers, who share a vision of how teaching should be accomplished, at a professional 
development .  During the fifth year they are paid half time as interns, thus easing the economic 
burden of preparing to teach.100 
98 See KERCHNER & KOPPICH, supra note ___, at 74, 126-29, 147-48; Julie Blair, Minneapolis Labor Leaders Mold a 
Different Kind of Union, EDUC. WK., Jan. 30, 2002, at 1. 
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University of Cincinnati College of Education. Goals of the program include improving the quality of teacher 
training and increasing the pool of minority applicants for CPS teaching positions. The PPS Panel shall set the terms 
of the partnership between CFT, CPS, and UC, consistent with this contract. The PPS Panel shall establish rules 
governing changes in assignments and additional assignments for Graduate Student Interns.”  Cincinnati Federation 
of Teachers, Professional Practice Schools 2001, available at http://cft.mwg.org/prof/practice.html (visited July 7, 
2006). 
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One of the most obvious drawbacks to entering teaching, and to the effectiveness of 
novice teachers, is the shameful level of non-assistance that most young teachers receive from 
their school districts or their unions.  Kauffman's exploration of the initial encounters of new 
teachers begins with the plaintive cry by from a novice, "You want me to teach this stuff, but I 
don't have the stuff to teach."101 The way in which new teachers encounter the curriculum 
strongly influences their sense of accomplishment and the set of rewards that flow from teaching. 
 In Kauffman's interviews, teachers said they received very little assistance from either the 
districts or their unions.102  Among the 50 teachers interviewed by Kauffman and his colleagues, 
not one of them said that their union helped them become a teacher or survive the first year.  The 
only mention was that they had to pay union dues.103 
The bitter irony of continuing traditional sink-or-swim induction in teaching is that it 
contributes to teacher turnover in the same places where teachers are in the shortest supply: big 
central cities.  The daunting personnel practices in districts such as New York City are legendary. 
 The same system that hires thousands of uncertified teachers each year discourages fully 
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qualified students with master's degrees, who are then wooed by suburban districts.104 
Professional development offers a good example of a long-term working relationship that 
has increasingly focused on student standards and achievement.  The Minneapolis project started 
in 1984 with a small joint labor-management task force that over time grew to a pilot project, 
state legislation and a jointly governed professional development program.105  
Union reforms have also dealt with how teachers are paid.  Since 1921, when the single 
salary schedule was introduced in Denver and Des Moines, the rank and column, civil-service-
type salary schedule has become virtually universal in public schools.  Regardless of gender, 
race, or grade level teachers are paid the same depending only on their years of service and level 
of academic preparation.  Indeed, in its time, the existing salary schedule was thought to be both 
a model of fairness and a reasonable incentive system.  The system rewarded teachers for 
investing their time and personal funds in further education, and it brought to a close the 
longstanding practice of paying men more than women and white teachers more than teachers of 
color.  It also began to distance teacher raises from direct administrative supervision, favoritism, 
and political influence.  The single salary schedule was also easy to administer because the basis 
of a teacher's pay was objective and understandable.106 The utility of this system explains its long 
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tenure.   
Only recently has there been serious discussion of alternatives.  The most discussed 
alternative is actually a relatively slight modification of the existing system: paying for 
knowledge and skill.  Odden and Kelley advocate linking to formal education, as it now is, and 
the achievement of knowledge and skills required by new curriculum standards and new roles 
required of teachers in reorganized schools.107  
They also advocate the use of contingent pay, an extension of what is commonly called 
"extra pay for extra work."  But instead of being focused on extracurricular activities, as are most 
current contingent pay schemes, these are focused on enhancing student achievement.  Teachers 
who complete professional development tasks, for example would be eligible for bonuses as 
would teachers who collaborated on projects linked to creating school programs that increase 
achievement or worked on valuable individual projects.108 
A form of contingent pay can be found in assistance in preparing for and stipends for 
obtaining certification by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards.  Both the AFT 
and NEA have supported legislation to encourage teachers to become certified, and in many 
localities unions have bargained salary incentives for board certification.  For example, the Los 
Angeles Unified School District and United Teachers Los Angeles bargained a 15 percent salary 
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supplement for any board-certified teacher.  In New York City, board certification qualifies a 
teacher for a salary differential of approximately $3,700.  In Chicago, the union QuEst Center, 
with a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, is supporting 20 
candidates for board certification.109 
The most imaginative and most dramatic deviation from the standard salary schedule is 
taking place in the 70,000 student Denver, Colorado, school district where in fall 2005 voters 
approved a tax measure that would fund an incentive pay plan for teachers.110  A vote of Denver 
Classroom Teacher Association members approved the plan in 2004.  The Denver plan, which 
was devised by a union-management design team over six years, pays teachers for specific 
knowledge and skills they have acquired (as opposed to any college education school credits, 
which is more usual), according the results of their professional evaluations, as an incentive to 
teach in hard to staff schools and in hard to find specialties, and, lastly, according to student 
achievement.  Professional evaluation is to be run by a council composed of teachers, 
administrators and community members.  The council’s procedures must be in accord with the 
teachers’ union contract.  All new teachers are automatically enrolled in the incentive plan.  
Veteran teachers have six years to decide whether to join or to stay with the traditional salary 
 
109 See KERCHNER & KOPPICH, supra note __, at 289. 




In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, at the I.D.E.A.L. Charter School, teachers have remained 
employees of the Milwaukee Public Schools and governed by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  However, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the district and the 
union, the teachers have flexibility concerning some provisions of the master collective 
bargaining agreement.  The teachers at the school created the I.D.E.A.L. Charter School 
Cooperative which they own and through which they control all professional aspects of the 
school.112  
B. Why Are These the Exceptions Instead of the Rule: The Role of Legal 
Doctrine 
The above examples have attracted considerable attention because they are the 
exceptions to the industrial labor relations model that dominates teacher union - school district 
relationships.  In the following sections, we explore the law governing teacher collective 
bargaining and find that the law inhibits these exceptions from flourishing and spreading. 
1. The Basic Structure of the Law Governing Teacher Collective Bargaining. 
111 See Agreement School District No. 1 and the Denver Classroom Teachers Assoication, (2004); Denver Public 
Schools Professional Compensation System for Teachers, http://denverprocomp.org/stories/storyreader$88?print-
friendly=true (visited Mar. 12, 2006).   
112 See DIRKSWAGER, supra note ____, at 63. 
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At one time courts upheld school district prohibitions on teachers belonging to labor unions.113 It 
is now well-established that such a prohibition violates the employee’s First Amendment right to 
freedom of association.114 However, the right to associate with a union does not extend to a 
constitutional right to be represented by a union, even where the representation would be 
individual, rather than collective, in an employer’s own unilaterally promulgated grievance 
system.115 A majority of the states and the District of Columbia have statutes giving all public 
employees rights to organize and bargain collectively.116 Several other states have statutes giving 
teachers rights to organize and bargain collectively, even though they do not have general public 
sector labor relations statutes.117 Some states, most notably Virginia and North Carolina, 
however, prohibit public entities from recognizing or bargaining with employees’ collective 
 
113 See, e.g., Seattle High Sch. Teachers Chap. 200 v. Sharples, 293 P. 994 (Wash. 1930); People ex. Rel. Fursman v. 
City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 158 (Ill. 1917). 
114 See, e.g., AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 
1968); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
115 Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 4623 (1979). 
116 The following jurisdictions have such comprehensive public sector labor relations statutes: Alaska, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. 
117 Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Tennessee. 
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representatives.118 Others, such as Arizona and Colorado, do not mandate that a public employer 
recognize and bargain with a representative selected by a majority of its employees, but allow 
such bargaining at the employer’s option. 
Collective bargaining is more closely regulated in the public sector than in the private 
sector.  Most public sector collective bargaining statutes provide mandatory impasse procedures 
which almost always include mediation and frequently include fact finding.119 In many 
jurisdictions, teacher unions that reach impasse with school districts may compel fact finding but 
have no further impasse procedure.  In fact finding, a neutral third party conducts a hearing and 
issues findings of fact and recommendations for settlement, but either party is free to reject the 
recommendations.  Because the employer controls terms and conditions of employment, it is free 
to reject the fact finder’s recommendations and impose its own terms.  Other jurisdictions 
provide that bargaining impasses be resolved by binding interest arbitration.  A few jurisdictions 
give teachers a right to strike following exhaustion of specified impasse procedures, which in 
some of these jurisdictions include fact finding and rejection of the fact finder’s 
recommendations.120 
2. What the Law Requires School Districts to Negotiate.  Although a few 
 
118 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-98; VA. CODE §§40.1-57.2. 
119 See generally JOSEPH GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 326-30 (2004). 
120 For an overview of the different models see Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and 
Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 313, 316-35 (1993). 
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jurisdictions, most notably New Jersey,121 divide subjects of bargaining into mandatory and 
prohibited, most follow the model developed under the NLRA, dividing subjects into mandatory, 
permissive and prohibited.  As the names imply, mandatory subjects are those over which 
negotiation is required.  Employers may not make unilateral changes without first bargaining and 
exhausting statutorily prescribed impasse procedures.  Permissive subjects are those on which 
bargaining is allowed but not required.  Generally, a party may not insist to impasse on its 
position on a permissive subject and disputes over such subjects are not subject to statutorily 
prescribed impasse procedures.  An employer may choose not to bargain and may act unilaterally 
at its option.  Prohibited subjects are those on which the parties are forbidden to bargain and on 
which any collective bargaining agreement is unenforceable. 
Most states require bargaining over “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment,” a term of art developed under the NLRA.122 Many states also have statutory 
management rights provisions exempting management functions from bargaining.123  A few, such 
as Iowa and Kansas, specify subjects over which bargaining is required, leaving all subjects not 
so specified as permissive.124 Interestingly, Delaware uses the general term, wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment to define the scope of mandatory bargaining for most 
 
121 See Ridgefield Park Ed. Assn v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 393 A.2d 278 (N.J. 1978). 
122 See, e.g., 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 979-D(1); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. §423.215; WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.70. 
123 See, e.g., 5 ILCS 325/4, 315/7; PA. STAT. §§ 1101.701, 1101.702. 
124 IA. CODE ANN. § 20.9; KANS. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(b). 
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public employees, but limits mandatory bargaining for educational employees to salaries, benefits 
and physical working conditions.125 
States whose statutes mandate bargaining over wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment or states that couple such a general requirement with a management 
rights provision generally balance the employees’ interests in negotiating working conditions 
against the impact of the issue on managerial prerogatives and public policy.126 These states 
express concern that, to the extent that a subject concerns issues of educational policy, mandating 
bargaining would intrude on nondelegable duties of the democratically elected and 
democratically accountable school board.  As the Maryland Court of Appeals, in holding that 
school calendar and employee reclassifications are prohibited subjects of bargaining, explained: 
Local [school] boards are state agencies, and, as such, are responsible to other appropriate 
state officials and to the public at large. Unlike private sector employers, local boards 
must respond to the community’s needs.  Public school employees are but one of many 
 
125 Compare 19 Del. C. § 1301(3) with 14 Del. C. § 4008(a); see Newman v. Bd. of Educ. Mt. Pleasant Sch. Dist., 
350 A.2d 339 (Del. 1975); Colonial Schools Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, 1982 WL 17849 (Del. Ch. 1982). 
126 See, e.g., San Jose Peace Officers v. City of San Jose, 144 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); West Hartford 
Educ. Ass’n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1972); Central City Educ. Ass’n v. Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd., 599 
N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1992); Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20 v. City of Miami, 609 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1992); 
Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ., 534 A.2d 980 (Md. 1987); City of Lynn v. Labor Rel. Comm’n, 
681 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. App. 1997); Springfield Educ. Ass’n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 621 P.2d 547 (Or. 
1980); City of Brookfield v. Wisc. Emp. Rel. Comm’n, 275 N.W.2d 723 (Wisc. 1979). 
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groups in the community attempting to shape educational policy by exerting influence on 
local boards.   To the extent that school employees can force boards to submit educational 
policy to an arbitrator, the employees can distort the democratic process by increasing 
their influence at the expense of these other groups.127   
The negotiability of numerous issues has been litigated under this rubric.  The result has 
been an ad hoc approach that lacks predictability and encourages litigation.  As the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals candidly observed, “[A]ny attempt to define with precision and 
certainty the subjects about which bargaining is mandated . . . is doomed to failure.”128  What 
follows is a discussion of some of the more commonly litigated issues. 
a.  Class Size. No issue better exemplifies the tension between questions of teacher 
working conditions and questions of public policy than the issue of class size.  At its base, class 
size directly relates to teacher work load, a basic working condition.  However, much of the 
discussion over class size focuses not on appropriate work loads but on the educational costs and 
benefits of smaller class sizes.  It costs money to reduce class size and thus issues of class size 
raise issues of educational policy in allocation of resources.  Will children benefit more from 
hiring additional staff to reduce class size or from upgrading technology available in the 
classrooms?   
 
127 Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ., 534 A.2d 980, 987 (Md. 1987)(citation omitted); see also 
Appeal of City of Concord, 651 A.2d 944, 946 (N.H. 1994)(expressing similar concerns). 
128 City of Lynn v. Labor Rel. Comm’n, 681 N.E.2d 1234, 1237 (Mass. App. 1997). 
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 Not surprisingly, the jurisdictions are deeply divided over how to treat class size.  How 
the balance is struck generally depends on who is reading the scales.  For example, Connecticut, 
Illinois and Maine have held that class size is a mandatory subject of bargaining.129 Florida, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York and Wisconsin have held it to be permissive.130 
New Jersey and South Dakota have held it to be prohibited,131 and, as developed below, in the 
1990s, several states amended their statutes to prohibit or restrict bargaining on class size. 
b.  School Calendar. Racine Education Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
 
129 West Hartford Educ Ass’n v. DeCourcy, 295 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1972); Decatur Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. 
Bd., 536 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. 1989); City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass’n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). 
130 Hillsborough Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Sch. Bd., 423 So.2d 969 (Fla. App. 1982); NEA-Topeka v. Unified 
Sch. Dist. 501, 592 P.2d 92 (Kan. 1979); Boston Teachers Union v. School Committee, 350 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 
1976); Seward Educ. Ass’n v. School Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752 (Neb. 1972); W. Irondequoit Teachers Ass’n v. 
Helsby, 315 N.E.2d 775 (N.Y. 1974); Beloit Educ. Ass’n v. Wisc. Emp. Rel. Comm’n, 242 N.W.2d 231 (Wisc. 
1976). 
131 Dunnellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunnellen Educ. Ass’n, 311 A.2d 737 (N.J. 1973); Aberdeen Educ. Ass’n v. Aberdeen 
Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974).  Subsequently, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the approach 
taken in Aberdeen defined mandatory subjects of bargaining too narrowly, although the court has not overruled the 
specific holding of Aberdeen that bargaining over class size is prohibited.  Indeed, the court has indicated that it 
agrees with the general approach followed in New Jersey and that approach, as applied by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, found class size to be a prohibited subject.  See Rapid City Educ. Ass’n v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. 51-4, 
376 N.W.2d 562 (S.D. 1985). 
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Commission132 vividly illustrates the tensions between competing interests that courts balance in 
deciding whether to mandate bargaining over school calendars.  At issue was the school district’s 
decision to move from a nine-month to a year round school calendar.  Such an issue clearly raises 
questions of educational policy and just as clearly significantly impacts teachers’ working 
conditions.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission which struck the balance against mandating bargaining, determining that 
this was a matter of educational policy on which the school board should enjoy unilateral control. 
 In Maryland, bargaining over the school calendar is prohibited.133 On the other hand, in 
Connecticut, the number of teacher student contact days and number of teacher work days are 
mandatory subjects.134 Other states have not seen issues of school calendar in such all or nothing 
ways. 
California initially distinguished between the student calendar, which it held was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining,135 and the teacher work calendar which it held was a mandatory 
subject.136 However, the California PERB appeared to collapse that distinction in Poway Unified 
 
132 571 N.W.2d 887(Wisc. App. 1997). 
133 Montgomery County Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 534 A.2d 980 (Md. 1987). 
134 State v. Bd. of Lab. Rel., 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 210, 1993 WL 7261 (Conn. Super. 1993). 
135 Compton Community College District, 1990 Cal.PERB Decision No. 790. 
136 Davis Jt. Unified Sch. Dist. 1984 Cal. PERB Decision No. 474. 
-50- 
School District.137 In Poway, the school board unilaterally implemented a student school 
calendar, setting student attendance days and school district holidays, while purporting to 
continue negotiating with the union over the teacher work calendar.  The PERB held, however, 
that by setting the student calendar, the district effectively set the teacher work calendar.  It 
distinguished Compton as a case where the calendar set as the student calendar was expressly 
marked tentative and subject to revision after negotiations with the teachers’ union. 
 The Indiana Court of Appeals has held that such matters as the date of the first day of 
school, dates when students will attend school for half days while teachers attend for full days, 
starting and ending dates of winter and spring breaks, holiday recesses, the closing of schools for 
a conference on instruction and the last day of pupil attendance are encompassed within the 
school board’s exclusive managerial power, thereby indicating that bargaining on such matters is 
prohibited.138 However, it has also held that make-up days and extra compensation for teaching 
on make-up days are permissive subjects of bargaining.139 
c.  Teacher Evaluations. Teacher evaluations raise similar conflicts as class size and 
school calendar.  Evaluations can affect job security, pay and assignments.  However, how 
evaluations are conducted also raises questions of educational policy.  Connecticut, Maine and 
 
137 25 Pub. Emp. Rep. Cal. (LRP) ¶ 32060 (Cal. PERB 2001). 
138 Indiana Educ. Emp. Rel. Bd. v. Highland Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 546 N.E.2d 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
139 Halley v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Blackford County Sch. Corp., 531 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Union 
County Sch. Corp. v. Indiana Educ. Emp. Rel. Bd., 471 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
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New Hampshire have held that evaluation programs are a permissive subject of bargaining.140 
Kansas distinguishes between evaluative criteria, which it has held are not mandatorily 
bargainable and evaluation procedures on which it has required bargaining.141 
d.  Miscellaneous Other Subjects. Courts and labor boards have confronted a wide 
diversity of other subjects in which employees’ rights to bargain collectively butt up against 
school board prerogatives to set policy.  In the private sector, rules barring smoking in the 
workplace are clearly a matter of working conditions that must be bargained.  Even in the public 
sector, the tendency is to require bargaining.  Thus, even the Department of Health & Human 
Services was required to bargain with the unions representing its workers over a ban on 
smoking.142 Connecticut and Vermont, however, have refused to require bargaining over 
smoking prohibitions in public education.143 They reason that smoking bans are matters of 
working conditions but on balance the employer need not bargain a decision to ban smoking 
because of its educational policy to set an example for students showing that smoking is 
undesirable. 
 
140 Wethersfield Bd. of Educ. v. St. Bd. of Lab. Rel., 519 A.2d 41 (Conn, 1986); In re Pittsfield Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 
594 (N.H. 1999); Saso-Valley Teachers Ass’n v. MSAD 6, Case No. 79-56 (Me.L.R.B. Aug. 7, 1979). 
141 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 314 v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 856 P.2d 1343 (Kans. 1993); Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 352, Goodland v. NEA-Goodland, 246 Kan. 137 (1990). 
142 Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Federal Lab. Rel. Auth., 920 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
143 AFSCME Local 1186 v. St. Bd. of Lab. Rel., 5 Conn. L. Rptr. 738, 1991 WL 273780 (Conn. Super. 1991); Mt. 
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Merit pay has been argued to be a matter of educational policy.  However, the Maine 
Labor Relations Board has held it to be a mandatory subject.144 Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court has held that signing bonuses for teachers must be negotiated.145 
Length of the work day has produced conflicting results.  The Vermont Labor Relations 
Board has required bargaining.146 On the other hand, the South Dakota Supreme Court has held 
that setting maximum student contact hours is a prohibited subject of bargaining.147 
3. Legislative Backlash Against Teacher Bargaining. The law has largely 
confined unions to a role of negotiating contracts that protect their members from the impact of  
management decisions.  Overall, most teacher unions have performed very well in that role.  In 
some cases, this excellent performance has resulted in major legislative backlash against teacher 
collective bargaining. 
The 1990s saw a significant amount of backlash against teacher collective bargaining.  In 
1994, Michigan enacted P.A. 112.  The statute was a reaction to Michigan court decisions that 
made it extremely difficult to enjoin a public employee strike, even though strikes by public 
 
Abraham Educ. Ass’n v. Mr. Abraham High Sch. Bd. Of Sch. Directors, 4 Vt.L.R.B. 224 (1981). 
144 Gray-New Glouster Ass’n v. MSAD 15, Case No. 85-01 (Me.L.R.B. Oct. 11, 1984) 
145 Crete Educ.. Ass’n v. Saline County Sch. Dist. No. 76-0002, 654 N.W.2d 166 (Neb. 2002). 
146 Castleton Educ. Ass’n v. Castleton-Hubbardton Bd. Of Sch. Directors, 13 Vt.L.R.B. 60 (1990). 
147 Rapid City Educ. Ass’n v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. 51-4, 376 N.W.2d 562 (S.D. 1985). 
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employees were illegal.148 Act 112 added mandatory fines against striking teachers and their 
unions, prohibited strikes over unfair labor practices and mandated that courts enjoin teacher 
strikes.149 The act also prohibited bargaining on the identity of a school district’s group 
insurance carrier, the starting day of the school term and the amount of required pupil contact 
time, composition of site-based decision-making bodies, decisions whether to provide 
interdistrict or intradistrict open enrollment opportunities, the decision to operate a charter 
school, the decision to contract out noninstructional support services, the decision to use 
volunteers for any services, and decisions to use instructional technology on a pilot basis.150 
Most of these subjects had been held to be mandatory subjects of bargaining by the Michigan 
courts and the Michigan Employment Relations Commission.151 
Contemporary media commentary suggests that the act was a backlash aimed primarily at 
the Michigan Education Association.152 In urging support for the bill, the Grand Rapids Press 
148 See Sch. Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass’n, 157 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1968). 
149 MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 423.202(a).  The requirement that courts automatically enjoin teacher strikes was struck 
down as a breach of the separation of powers between the legislature and the courts and apparently is now of no 
effect.  See Andrew Nickelhoff, Marching Headlong into the Past: 1994 PA 112 and the Erosion of School 
Employee Bargaining Rights, 74 MICH. B. J. 1186 (1995). 
150 MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 423.215(3). 
151 See Nickelhoff, supra note ___. 
152 See,e.g., John Foren, Engler-GOP Drive to Cut School Costs Aims at MEA, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 19, 
1994, at A1. 
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editorialized that the MEA’s “longstanding stranglehold on the bargaining process has given 
Michigan teachers a Rolls-Royce health-insurance plan, some of the highest school salaries in the 
country and virtual immunity from the state law forbidding public employee strikes.  A 
consequence is that Michigan school costs from 1980 through ’92 rose an average of 8.1 percent 
a year, with the difference being passed along to citizens in their property-tax bills.”153 It 
applauded that under the act “school boards could no longer be bullied into buying insurance 
through the MEA’s subsidiary. . .”154 A stated rationale for restricting these subjects of 
bargaining was to foreclose disputes over these subjects from creating impasses in 
negotiations.155 
Around the same time, legislative backlash against teacher bargaining also arose in 
Oregon.  The Oregon Court of Appeals held that class size was a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.156 A few years later, the legislature amended the Oregon statute to exclude from 
mandatory subjects of bargaining: 
class size, the school or educational calendar, standards of performance or criteria for 
 
153 Senate’s Turn on School Costs: House-passed Bill Shifts Control from MEA to Taxpayers,. Boards, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 19, 1994, at A8. 
154 Id. 
155 See Michael Matheson, Note, Have Michigan Public School Teachers Lost Their Ability to Strike Under 1994 PA 
112?, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 415, 430 (1998). 
156 Tualatin Valley Bargaining Council v. Tigard Sch. Dist., 808 P.2d 191 (Ore. App. 1991). 
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evaluations of teachers, the school curriculum, reasonable dress, grooming and at-work 
personal conduct respecting smoking, gum chewing and similar matters of personal 
conduct, the standards and procedures for student discipline, the time between student 
classes, the selection, agendas and decisions of 21st Century Schools Councils . . .157 
In Illinois, where strikes by public employees other than law enforcement personnel and 
firefighters are lawful, the 1995 Chicago School Reform Act prohibited strikes against the 
Chicago Public Schools and the City Colleges of Chicago for a specified period of time.  The 
statute also prohibited decision and impact bargaining on the following subjects: charter school 
proposals and leaves of absence to work for a charter school, subcontracting, layoffs and 
reductions in force, class size, class staffing and assignment, class schedules, academic calendar, 
hours and places of instruction, pupil assessment policies, use and staffing of pilot programs, and 
use of technology and staffing to provide technology.158 Contemporary media accounts suggest 
that the restrictions on bargaining were aimed at the Chicago Teachers Union.159 In 2003, after 
Democrats were elected to majorities in both houses of the legislature and after a Democrat was 
elected governor, the Chicago School Reform Act was amended to make these subjects 
 
157 OREGON REV.STAT. § 243.650(e). 
158 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4.5, as enacted by P.A. 89-15 § 10 (effective May 30, 1995). 
159 See Doug Finke & Amy E. Williams, GOP Plan for Chicago Schools Takes Aim at Union, STATE JOURNAL-
REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), May 11, 1995, at 1. 
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permissive subjects of bargaining.160 
Similar school reform legislation in Pennsylvania limited collective bargaining rights.  
Under Act 46, enacted in 1998, whenever the Philadelphia school system is found to be in 
financial distress, bargaining may not be required over subcontracting, reductions in force, 
staffing patterns, assignments, class schedules, school calendar, pupil assessment, teacher 
preparation time, experimental programs, charter schools and use of technology.161 
4. The Inhibiting Effects of Current Legal Doctrine on the Attainment of High 
Performance Educational Workplaces. In high performance workplaces, employees take 
responsibility for decision making within their areas of expertise.  They invest in and assume 
responsibility for the risks of the enterprise and share in its rewards.  Under current legal 
doctrine, however,  traditional collective bargaining is not a likely vehicle for meaningful teacher 
voice in educational policy.  Because courts and labor boards balance teacher interests in wages 
and working conditions against school board interests in setting educational policy in deciding 
whether to compel bargaining on a given issue, to gain the right to bargain a particular issue, 
teachers must emphasize their traditional bread-and-butter interests in the issue and de-
 
160 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4.5, as amended b y P.A. 93-3, § 10 (effective Apr. 16, 2003).
161 See David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the Schoolhouse: How Legislatures and 
Courts Shaped Labor Relations for Public Education Employees During the Last Decade, 39 J. L. & EDUC. 275, 
295-96 (2001). 
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emphasize the educational policy aspects of the issue.  Thus, where teachers have been able to 
compel bargaining over class size, they have done so by situating it as an issue of teacher 
workload, regardless of whether their motivation is to gain voice in the educational policy 
concerns involved in setting class size.  This emphasis on the bread-and-butter aspects of such 
issues can fuel political backlash, as it appears that teacher unions advocate only the personal 
interests of their members regardless of educational policy, leading to legislative efforts to curtail 
bargaining where it has occurred.   
 Furthermore, many issues of educational policy are simply not amenable to 
characterization in terms of traditional bread-and-butter concepts of wages and working 
conditions.  In such cases, teacher arguments for bargaining are dismissed out-of-hand without 
resort to balancing competing interests at all.  For example, in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. 
Wisconsin  Employment Relations Commission,162 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a 
requirement that teachers call parents during first two weeks of the school year was not a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because it had no impact on teachers wages, hours or working 
conditions.  Consequently, the court found it unnecessary to balance teacher interests in 
bargaining the subject against educational policy concerns.  More significant policy issues on 
which teachers seek a voice, such as curriculum reform, pupil assessment, social promotion 
policies, and allocation of resources for providing remedial assistance, will never enter the 
balancing process because they cannot be characterized in terms of traditional bread-and-butter 
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issues of wages and working conditions.  Innovations that teachers may seek to press, such as 
peer review, will run into doctrines that the hiring, evaluation and retention of teachers are 
nondelegable duties of the school board. 
Under current legal doctrine, if a matter is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the 
employer is under no legal obligation to give teachers a voice.  The employer need not furnish 
information concerning the subject to the union.163 The employer may make and implement 
decisions unilaterally and may deal with whatever select group of employees it desires.164 
The 1996 report of the Secretary of Labor’s Task Force165 described how this legal 
doctrine inhibits movement toward a high performance workplace.  The task force observed: 
Because it affects the capacity of an agency or jurisdiction to improve service, the clearest 
need is for workers, managers and union leaders to be able to discuss the full range of 
issues affecting the service they are working to improve.  In a traditional labor-
management relationship characterized by formal or legalistic approaches, such 
discussion often is precluded by concerns over setting precedents that might lead to 
 
162 580 N.W.2d 375 (Wisc. App. 1998). 
163 See, e.g., Village of Franklin Park v. State Lab. Rel. Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ill. App. 1994). 
164 See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App. 1999). 
165 WORKING TOGETHER IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR’S TASK FORCE ON 
EXCELLENCE IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (1996) 
[hereinafter WORKING TOGETHER]. 
-59- 
giving up prerogatives.166 
The law thus inhibits the transition to a high performance educational workplace by 
diverting attention from harnessing teachers’ talents and expertise and focusing attention on 
setting precedents and relinquishment of managerial prerogatives.  The inhibiting nature of 
existing legal doctrine goes beyond the effects recognized by the Secretary’s Task Force.  Parties 
naturally internalize the legal model in their relationships.  Consequently, teacher unions tend to 
limit their focus to protecting their members from the risks created by managerial decision 
making instead of sharing in the risks of the organization and becoming agents for positive 
change.  Such an approach is politically safer for union leaders.  For example, it is much easier to 
negotiate percentage increases to a uniform salary grid than to participate in an assessment of 
personnel needs and negotiate incentives that better meet those needs. 
V. Labor Law Doctrine and Charter Schools 
In light of the role that the law has channeled most teacher unions into, it is not 
surprising that most teachers in charter schools see their unions as lacking relevance to their 
working lives.167 In this Part, we consider whether collective representation can serve as a 
vehicle for teacher voice in the high performance educational workplace that the charter school 
model envisions.   
 A. Which Law Governs: State Law or the NLRA? 
 
166 Id. at 65. 
167 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. 
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Many charter schools are chartered to not-for-profit corporations and are run by the 
corporation’s board of directors.  A threshold legal issue arises as to whether the charter school is 
considered to be a private sector employer, subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
or a public employer governed by state law.  The NLRA defines “employer” as follows: 
The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government 
Corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . 
.168 
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of what constitutes a “State or political 
subdivision thereof” in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District.169 At issue was whether a public 
utility district organized under the Tennessee Utility District Law of 1937 was a subdivision of 
the State of Tennessee and, therefore, exempt from NLRA coverage.  The Court held that this 
issue was to be decided under federal law and thus the law of the State of Tennessee was not 
controlling.170  The Court observed that the National Labor Relations Board had limited the 
exemption for political subdivisions of a state to entities “created directly by the state, so as to 
constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or administered by individuals 
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who are responsible to public officials or to the electorate in general.”171 Under that 
interpretation, the NLRB had held that the district was not exempt. 
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the exemption should be broader than 
as defined by the NLRB.  It concluded that under the NLRB’s interpretation, the district was 
exempt.  The Court emphasized that the district was administered by a board appointed by a 
county judge; was subject to removal for misfeasance or nonfeasance upon petition by the 
governor, attorney general, county prosecutor or ten citizens; had the power of eminent domain; 
was subject to Tennessee public records laws; had subpoena powers; and served for nominal 
compensation.172   
The narrowness of the political subdivision exemption is illustrated by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in NLRB v. Kemmer Village, Inc.173 Kemmer Village 
operated a foster home that depended on the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services 
for three-fourths of its revenue.  The court rejected out of hand the employer’s contention that it 
was an exempt political subdivision: 
The state did not create or acquire Kemmer; it is not organized as a municipal corporation 
or other public entity; it is heavily subsidized by the state but if that is the criterion then 
every tobacco farmer in the nation is a political subdivision. . . . The gas distributor held 
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to be a political subdivision in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District could have been 
classified either way, but apparently what was decisive was that the power to appoint its 
governing board had been lodged in a public official. . . .174 
At times, the NLRB has recognized a related exemption that turns on the relationship 
between a private entity and an exempt public entity.  In Rural Fire Protection Co.,175 decided in 
1975, the Board held that it would not assert jurisdiction over a private entity if that entity’s 
operation was intimately related to a government function or if it did not retain sufficient control 
over its employees’ terms and conditions of employment to be capable of effective collective 
bargaining.  Four yeas later, the Board abandoned the intimate relationship test and held it would 
only hold private entities exempt if they had insufficient control over their employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.176 In 1986, in Res-Care, Inc.,177 the Board clarified that in 
determining whether meaningful collective bargaining was possible, it would examine not only 
the employer’s control over essential terms and conditions of employment but also the control 
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exercised by the governmental entity over the employer’s labor relations.  Nine years later, in 
National Training Corp.,178 the Board overruled Res-Care and held that it would recognize no 
exemption beyond the express statutory exemption for political subdivisions of a state. 
The Supreme Court has not considered whether a not-for-profit corporation operating a 
school closely connected with a public entity is a public entity exempt from the NLRA.  
However, it has considered whether such an entity’s conduct constitutes state action and makes 
such conduct subject to the constraints of the Constitution and subjects the entity to liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,179 several former teachers and a former 
vocational counselor sued a nonprofit school for maladjusted high school students alleging that 
their discharges were in retaliation for their exercise of their First Amendment right of free 
speech and deprived them of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The school specialized in educating students with drug, alcohol or behavioral 
problems or other special needs that impeded their completing high school.  It received all of its 
students through referrals by the Boston or Brookline, Massachusetts school districts or the Drug 
Rehabilitation Division of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health.  None of the students 
paid tuition.  The school was subject to extensive regulation by the State of Massachusetts and 
issued high school diplomas which were certified by the Brookline school district.180  The Court 
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held that the school was not a governmental actor and therefore was not subject to the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments or section 1983. 
The Court observed that the school’s dependence on the government for its funding did 
not make it a state actor.  In this regard, it considered the school no different from other private 
corporations whose business depends primarily on government construction contracts but who 
clearly were not government actors.181 
The Court similarly rejected the contention that the extensive governmental regulation to 
which the school was subject rendered it a governmental actor.  The Court reasoned that even 
extensive and detailed regulation does not convert a private entity into a governmental one and 
observed that the government exercised only minimal control over the school’s personnel 
decisions.182 
The Court acknowledged that the school performed a public function, i.e., providing free 
education to maladjusted high school students.183 However, it held that for a public function to 
render a private entity a state actor, the function must be one that has been the exclusive province 
of the government.  The services that the school provided fell short of meeting this test.184 
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the school and the government had a 
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symbiotic relationship.  The Court again relied on the comparability of the school’s dependence 
on public funding to construction contractors whose primary business was road construction or 
other government controlled projects.185 
A divided First Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the reach of Rendell-Baker in 
Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute.186 A school district operated its own schools 
for kindergarten through eighth grade but did not operate a high school.  Instead, it contracted 
with Maine Central Institute (MCI), a privately operated high school in the district.  The contract 
obligated MCI to accept and educate all of the district’s ninth through twelfth grade students in 
exchange for tuition payments made by the district.187 The parents of a student who had been 
suspended for seventeen days sued contending that the suspension deprived their child of liberty 
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.188 
By two to one vote, the court held that MCI was not a state actor and therefore not 
subject to the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court reasoned that the provision of 
education, while a public function, was not exclusively a public function.189  The parents argued 
that MCI not only provided education, but because the school district did not operate a high 
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school, MCI was the high school of last resort for students in the district and, accordingly, 
performed an exclusive public function.  The court majority rejected this argument as 
unsupported by the history of education in Maine, noting that before public high schools became 
widespread, private schools received public funds and were the only source of secondary 
education in the state.190 
The court also rejected the parents’ contention that MCI was so entwined with the school 
district that its actions were clothed with the governmental nature of the school district.  The 
court emphasized that MCI was governed by a private board of trustees, not by public officials, 
and that the private trustees had the authority to promulgate, administer and enforce rules relating 
to student behavior.191 The presence of a joint committee of three MCI trustees and three school 
board members did not change the outcome because the committee acted only in an advisory 
capacity.192 
A federal district court declined to apply Logiodice to an Ohio charter school in Reister 
v. Riverside Community School.193 The court held that, although it was a private corporation, the 
school was subject to suit by a former teacher who alleged that her termination retaliated against 
her exercise of her First Amendment right to free speech.  The court observed that the Ohio 
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statute declared that charter schools were public schools and part of the state’s program of public 
education.194  The court further reasoned that the charter school provided free public education, a 
function that historically was the exclusive function of government in Ohio.195 The declaration 
contained in the Ohio charter school statute and the status of free public education in Ohio, in the 
court’s view, distinguished the case from Logiodice.196  Read together, Logiodice and Reister 
suggest that whether a not-for-profit corporation operating a charter school will be considered a 
state actor may turn on the history of the provision of free education in the particular state in 
which the school operates. 
The NLRB’s approach to coverage of nominally private schools appears analogous to the 
courts’ approach to coverage of those schools under the Constitution and section 1983.  For 
example, in Krebs School Foundation, Inc.,197 the Board held that a private nonprofit corporation 
that operated a school providing special education services was an employer under the NLRA.  
The school received 90 percent of its students from contracts with public school districts and 
Massachusetts statute set its tuition rates, student-faculty ratio, curriculum and health & safety 
requirements.  However, the Board found that the school was not required to accept every student 
referred to it, and the government did not dictate the school’s facilities, hours of operation, 
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personnel policies, salaries or day-to-day operations. 
 In C. I. Wilson Academy, Inc.,1989 a National Labor Relations Board Administrative Law 
Judge held that an Arizona charter school was a private employer subject to the NLRB’s 
jurisdiction.  The school was chartered by the State Board of Education to a private, not-for-
profit corporation.  The school’s incorporator controlled the composition of the school’s board of 
directors and controlled decisions to hire and discharge the school’s officers and employees.  The 
ALJ concluded that no individual or group of individuals involved in the school’s administration 
were responsible to the general electorate.  He further surveyed the relationship between the 
school and the State Board of Education and concluded that the State Board’s functions were 
regulatory in nature and that the Board was not involved in overseeing the implementation of the 
school’s operational policies. 
 The California Public Employment Relations Board (Cal PERB) Regional Director 
distinguished C. I. Wilson in holding that a charter school was a public school employer subject 
to Cal PERB’s jurisdiction in Options for Youth – Victor Valley, Inc..199 The school argued that 
it was subject to NLRB jurisidction and not to Cal PERB jurisdiction because it was a private 
corporation, run by a board of directors who were not public officials and controlled its own day-
to-day operations.  The Regional Director, however, looked to California statute and a California 
appellate court decision which, in upholding the constitutionality of the California charter school 
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statute, opined that charter schools in California are responsible to and depend for their continued 
existence on the public body that grants the charter.  In the absence of the statute and in the 
absence of the continuing approval of the chartering body, the charter school could not exist.  
Furthermore, the Regional Director observed, the charter itself declared that the school was the 
public employer of the school’s employees for purposes of collective bargaining and that the 
school would be deemed a school district for purposes of the California Education Code.  The 
Regional Director concluded that the school was a public employer subject to the California 
Education Employment Relations Act and was a political subdivision of the state under Natural 
Gas Utility District.
However, the reach of  C. I. Wilson may not be limited to Arizona.  For example, the 
District of Columbia charter school statute expressly declares that employees of charter schools 
shall not be considered to be employees of the D.C. Public Schools or the D.C. government.200 
Although the Florida charter schools statute declares that all charter schools are part of the state’s 
program of public education and are public schools,201 it further provides that a charter school 
may be a public or private employer depending on the nature of the entity that operates it.202 The 
Florida Attorney General has advised that the Florida charter school statute does not invest 
members of a charter school’s governing body with powers and authority that would make them 
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public officers.  Consequently, the Florida Constitution’s prohibition of one person holding two 
public offices at the same time does not prohibit a county commissioner from serving on a 
charter school governing board.203 Thus, charter schools in jurisdictions such as the District of 
Columbia and Florida may be subject to NLRB jurisdiction. 
In contrast, the Massachusetts statute declares that charter school employees are public 
employees for collective bargaining purposes,204 and provides that the school’s board of trustees 
are considered to be public agents.205 The Idaho statute contains a similar declaration and the 
Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a charter school is a public school and therefore may not sue 
a former employee for defamation.206 
The Delaware Charter School Act of 1995 declares that charter school employees are 
covered by the state’s Public School Employment Relations Act,207 but at least one commentator 
has questioned whether charter schools in Delaware are public bodies and whether their 
employees are public employees.208 She has noted that Delaware charter schools are organized 
and managed under the Delaware General Corporation law, board members are not elected and 
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are not appointed by a public official, and the only accouterments of public employment are the 
declaration that the employees are subject to the public employee collective bargaining statute 
and a provision allowing charter schools to opt into coverage by the state pension plan.  If 
Delaware charter schools are considered not to be public bodies and their employees not public 
employees, the National Labor Relations Act would preempt the application of the state public 
school collective bargaining statute. 
Whether charter schools are likely to be governed by the NLRA or state law thus will 
depend on the peculiarities of how the schools are treated under the law of their states.  Coverage 
under the NLRA offers several advantages to coverage under state law.  First, in states that do 
not have statutes recognizing teachers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, coverage 
under the NLRA will protect those rights and provide a vehicle whereby teachers can compel a 
charter school to recognize and bargain with their union.   
 In this regard, the C. I. Wilson decision is ironic.  Charter schools have, at times, been 
attacked as vehicles for union busting.  However, Arizona has no public employee collective 
bargaining statute.  Hence, if the charter school had been governed by state law, its teachers 
would have had no right to organize and bargain collectively.  Instead, because the charter school 
was held to be a private entity subject to the NLRA, its teachers received the same organizational 
and collective bargaining rights as any other private sector employee. 
Furthermore, coverage under the NLRA frees teacher unions up from the often detailed 
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and laborious impasse procedures provided for in state public employee bargaining statutes.  As 
private sector employees, charter school teachers have a right to strike and no obligation to resort 
to mediation or factfinding before engaging in a strike.   
Additionally, the scope of bargaining will likely be broader under the NLRA than under 
state law.  Issues such as class size, teacher evaluations, tenure standards, student contact hours 
and smoking prohibitions, when viewed through a private sector labor law lens, are straight 
forward working conditions and clearly mandatory subjects of bargaining.  Where the charter 
school is a private entity, there is no concern with the delegation of nondelegable public duties to 
the collective bargaining process. 
However, the private sector contains a much broader exclusion of managers from 
statutory coverage than is found in any public sector statute.  As noted previously, educators who 
have a voice in educational policy and who exercise independent judgment or discretion have 
been held to be managers and excluded from coverage under the NLRA.209 
B. Charter School Teacher Representation Under State Law 
 The states that provide for a right to organize and bargain collectively employ a diversity 
of approaches to charter school employee collective bargaining rights.  Louisiana flatly declares 
that a charter school is governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered into 
by the school board in whose jurisdiction the charter school is located.210 Alaska provides that 
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all provisions of a collective bargaining agreement governing a school district and its teachers or 
other employees also govern the employees of a charter school within that district unless the 
school district and the union agree otherwise.211 Maryland provides that charter school 
employees are employees of the public school employer where the school is located but that the 
union and the charter school (rather than the regular school board) may negotiate contract 
amendments to address the charter school’s particular needs.212 Connecticut provides similarly, 
but allows a majority of the charter school employees and a majority of the charter school 
governing board to modify the district’s collective bargaining agreement as applied to the 
school.213 
In California, the Cal. PERB interpreted the state’s charter school statute as exempting 
charter schools from the state’s collective bargaining law.214 This holding prompted an 
amendment to the statute, which provides that the charter must declare whether the charter school 
is deemed the exclusive public employer of the school’s employees.  If the charter does not 
declare the school to be the employer, then the school district in which the charter is located is 
the employer.215 Thus, whether employees of a charter school are covered under an existing 
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collective bargaining agreement depends on the declaration in the charter.  If the charter declares 
the school to be the employer, then employees of the school must organize from scratch to 
achieve collective bargaining representation. 
Massachusetts distinguishes between schools chartered by the state and those chartered by 
a local school district.  For the former, the charter school’s board of trustees is deemed to be the 
employer and consequently, the school will be its own bargaining unit.  However, the statute 
facilitates organizing such a school’s employees by mandating recognition once a union has 
obtained signed authorization cards from 60 percent of the employees.216 
In Massachusetts, local school boards can charter schools, but only with the agreement of 
the local collective bargaining agent.217 The Massachusetts statute provides that employees of 
such a charter school are exempt from the local collective bargaining agreement to the extent 
provided for in the charter,218 but because the charter requires approval of the union, tailoring of 
the collective bargaining agreement for the charter school appears to require agreement of the 
union and the school board. 
 Similarly, Michigan requires that a charter school chartered by a school district abide by 
the school district’s collective bargaining agreements.219 The Michigan statute contains no 
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comparable provision for schools chartered by other entities. 
The Indiana statute provides that a teacher is an employee of the charter school, and has 
the right to organize and bargain collectively under the Indiana Educational Employees Relations 
Act,220 but, for collective bargaining purposes, employees of a conversion charter school are 
considered employees of the school district (called school corporation in Indiana) that sponsored 
the charter school.221 New Jersey also provides that employees of conversion charter schools 
remain part of the school district bargaining unit while employees of a start-up are a separate unit 
unless the board of trustees opts to offer the employees coverage under the school district’s 
contract.222 New York provides that employees of a conversion charter school are subject to the 
existing contract unless a majority of those employees vote to modify the contract, but provides 
that start-ups are separate bargaining units and are not covered by existing collective bargaining 
agreements.223 
The Delaware statute declares that employees of schools converted to charter status have 
the same rights to organize and bargain collectively as other public employees but are not to be 
part of the bargaining unit that represented employees of the school when it was not a charter 
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school.224 Although the statute is silent, presumably employees of new start-up charter schools 
are in their own bargaining units, but as discussed above, there is an issue as to whether 
employees of start-up charter schools are pubic employees or subject to the NLRA.225 New 
Hampshire mandates that charter school employees form their own bargaining unit.226 
Pennsylvania227 and Tennessee228 provide similarly.  Minnesota provides that charter schools are 
to be separate bargaining units.  However, the statute allows a charter school to be included in a 
school district’s bargaining unit if the charter school board, the school district board, the charter 
school employees and the school district union agree.229 
The Florida statute appears to vest in the employees the decision as to whether they have 
rights to organize and bargain collectively and whether they are part of an existing bargaining 
unit in their districts or form a separate bargaining unit.  The statute provides that “[c]harter 
school employees shall have the option to bargain collectively,” and that they may “bargain as a 
separate unit or as part of the existing district collective bargaining unit as determined by the 
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structure of the charter school.”230 It further provides that employees of an existing public school 
converted to charter status “remain public employees for all purposes, unless such employees 
choose not to do so.”231 Furthermore, the statute enables teachers at a charter school to form a 
partnership or cooperative and enter into a contract with the school to operate its instructional 
program and declares that under those circumstances the teachers are not public employees. 
As one can readily see, the application of charter school specific labor law adds layers of 
complexity to the already complex ad hoc determination of whether a particular matter is subject 
to negotiation.  Before teachers in a charter school ever reach the latter issue, they must 
determine whether their status is governed by the NLRA or state law and, if the latter, what their 
status is with respect to existing school district bargaining units.  These added layers of 
complexity increase the diversion of energy away from positive cooperative problem solving to 
battles over legal formalisms.   
Teacher employment relations in charter schools illustrate the inherent contradictions in 
American labor law.  By unshackling schools from the bureaucratic control of school district 
hierarchies and restrictive work rules, charter schools sought to create high involvement work 
places.  However, instead of creating professional communities, charter school advocates have 
fashioned a legal and policy environment that teeters between an industrial work environment 
and unrestricted managerial power. There is not much in traditional collective bargaining law 
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that encourages charter schools to become high performance workplaces.  To develop a labor law 
that fits the promise of charter schools, it is necessary to think outside the box of traditional labor 
law doctrine.  We address this need in the next Part. 
VI. Towards a Charter School Labor Law 
 If neither unrestricted managerial authority nor an industrial work environment will lead 
to high performance work places in the long run, what will?  Answering this question requires 
considering what kind of workers are required in high performance organizations and how labor 
law can encourage those workers. 
There are four basic ways to organize workers, each distinguished by the expectations of 
workers and legitimized by institutional and organizational rules.  Any worker, can be organized 
as either: (1) an industrial laborer, (2) a craft worker, (3) an artist, or (4) a professional.232 Unions 
can organize around any of these four, but the resulting unions emphasize different aspects of 
work.  Artists unionize around control over the work as well as its financial rewards.  For 
example, entertainment industry negotiations over who gets the “final cut” of a movie or control 
over the play-list at a radio station are as hard fought as negotiations over compensation.   
Likewise, professionals organize precisely over the question of who sets and controls 
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standards: witness the current struggle of physicians against health maintenance organizations.233 
Craft unions join economic concerns with an emphasis on skills.  They wield control through 
apprenticeship and job placement programs.  As Cobble reported, in the case of a now-disbanded 
waitress union, women assumed responsibility for “management” tasks such as hiring and 
discharge of employees, the mediation of on-the-job disputes, and the assurance of fair 
supervision.  “In a sense workers in the culinary industry had instituted a form of self-
management”234 
However, by the 1960s and 1970s when the majority of teachers in the United States 
unionized, the word “unionism” largely meant industrial unionism.  Older forms of worker 
organization—guilds, artisan associations, and craft unions—had largely been supplanted by a 
form of unionism designed to function within large hierarchies with an atomistic division of 
labor.  In public education, industrial unionism was labor’s answer to an education system 
constructed on the principles of scientific management, a system in which the content and pacing 
of work were not designed by teachers themselves but by school administrators.  As the history 
of education in the 20th century clearly shows, schools were bureaucratized long before they 
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were unionized.235 
Lore and literature portray teachers as artists.   Through its professional development and 
continuing education programs, management usually encourages teachers to become craft 
workers.  Some combination of these attributes is surely necessary in charter schools.  But strictly 
interpreted, industrial style organization would hold teachers responsible for the faithful 
reproduction of curricula, lesson plans, and classroom routines developed elsewhere.  Following 
directions would be their obligation and their main responsibility.  Invention, creativity, and 
spontaneity would not be required or expected.236 
Art and craft are usually thought of as individual characteristics, but in the workplace they 
are collective ones, and this fact brings us face-to-face with the historic union problem of how to 
bring together people of different organizational status.  This issue faced Sen. Robert Wagner 
and the framers of the National Labor Relations Act.  The widespread use of company-sponsored 
unions in the 1920s led the drafters of the NLRA to require an arms-length relationship between 
unions and management.  If close working relationships are necessary, it is necessary to ask: 
“What legal regime can best encourage collaborative, high-trust workplaces, and simultaneously 
empower and safeguard workers against ‘domination’ understood as illegitimate instrumental 
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coercion and endogenous shaping of workers’ preferences and interests?” 237  
The answer, we believe, is to broaden the set of choices about how charter school 
teachers would represent themselves.  The choice is now a simple one: collective bargaining or 
not.  In states where collective bargaining is not allowed there is no choice at all, unless the 
charter school is found to be a private employer subject to the NLRA.  Where teachers have the 
choice of traditional collective bargaining, the surrounding legal doctrine channels their voices 
toward an industrial union model.  However, the experiments in reform or professional unionism 
show us that during periods of cooperative relationships teachers and school management invent 
other forms of interaction including joint problem solving groups, systematic consultation, 
continuous negotiation, and autonomous work teams.   
Most of the districts engaged in what has been called reform or professional unionism, 
form joint labor-management teams to address educational problems.  For example, the 
Cincinnati, Ohio, school district and the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers agreed to form and 
manage a professional development center.  In Toledo, Ohio, and in Rochester, New York, union 
contracts specify the formation of joint teams to oversee the peer review systems.   
Consultation between union leaders and school superintendents is common during eras of 
good feeling.  These meetings are seen as an informal means of problem solving and relationship 
building, and they work well at the interpersonal level.  At least one state (Minnesota) has a 
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statutory requirement for consultation,238 but union leaders tell us that the requirement is often 
ignored. School principals and union representatives at the school level form consultative 
relationships more rarely.  This is the case partly because union stewards or building 
representatives see their jobs as being the first line of protection in teacher grievance situations 
rather than a legitimate part of a school leadership team.  But there are exceptions.   
The idea of autonomous work teams originates in manufacturing with such experiments 
as Saturn Motors and within producer’s cooperatives,239 and it is seen in education beginning 
with the School Site Management reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.240  Although applications 
varied widely, the general idea has been to move authority and resources to the school level and 
to encourage if not mandate teacher participation.  In Los Angeles, a large civic coalition that 
included the president of United Teachers Los Angeles, created a semi-autonomous school plan 
in which hiring authority and most of the school’s budget were to be at the disposal of a school’s 
leadership team, which was to include the union representative at that school and a majority of 
teachers.  The experiment, called LEARN, lasted for seven years before the political will that 
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founded it evaporated and the district reverted to a command-and-control management style.  
Perhaps a score of other school districts tried similar arrangements.241 
For several reasons, it would be inappropriate, however, to mandate legislatively a 
particular model of employee empowerment.  Such a mandate would merely substitute a new set 
of potentially stifling regulation for the old industrial labor relations model.  Rather, charter 
schools must be free to experiment with different approaches to teacher involvement.  Moreover, 
to the extent that a state attempted to apply such a mandate to a charter school subject to the 
NLRA, it would face a strong likelihood of preemption.  Such a mandate might be viewed as 
expanding the mandatory subjects of bargaining and thereby intruding into an area that Congress 
deliberately left free from mandatory regulation.242 
The charter itself provides an ideal method for ensuring such experimentation.  Charter 
school legislation should require that as a condition of the charter, the school specify a vehicle 
for teacher involvement in decision making.  The specific vehicle for teacher voice, however, 
would be up to the individual school, subject to the approval of the public body granting the 
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charter. 
A charter-by-charter approach to teacher involvement is much less likely than a specific 
statutory mandate to be preempted when applied to schools covered by the NLRA.  When a state 
imposes a specific statutory mandate on all charter schools, it is acting in its regulatory capacity 
and subject to preemption.  When a public entity grants a charter to a private entity, however, it 
is, in effect, contracting out some of the provision of public education.  As such, the public entity 
has entered the market to negotiate a particular arrangement.  When a public entity acts as a 
market participant, i.e., acts in its proprietary capacity, its requirements for contracting are not 
preempted by the NLRA.243 Moreover, in granting a charter and requiring that it contain a 
vehicle for teacher voice because the presence of such a vehicle is likely to provide advantages in 
the delivery of educational services, the public entity is acting with respect to a matter that is 
“deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.”244 
As different charter schools provide different vehicles for teacher voice, teachers may 
come to regard those options as a factor in deciding with which school to accept employment.  In 
an expanded choice set, teachers might choose schools offering joint problem solving groups, 
systematic consultation, continuous negotiation, autonomous work teams, or other arrangements.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 The approach we suggest offers several advantages.  First, it recognizes the fundamental 
fairness of the tradeoff between less job security and greater voice in running the school.  Charter 
schools seek to create high performance by creating risk.  A major tenet of the charter school 
concept is to free the school from bureaucratic state and school district regulation by enabling it 
to experiment and develop alternative approaches to teaching and learning.  The freedom from 
regulation thus injects variety and sometimes competition into public education with the most 
successful approaches expected to attract students, attain desired results, and survive competitive 
battles.  Schools that do not perform violate the conditions of their charters, and the chartering 
authority is not supposed to renew charters of poorly performing schools.  Thus, charter school 
teachers assume more risk than conventional public school teachers.  Their jobs are less secure 
and depend on school success.  In situations where teachers explicitly bet their jobs on the 
success of the school, teachers deserve a voice in how the school operates. 
Second, it makes good on the promise that charter schools will be different kinds of 
organizations, not just attempts to escape regulation for its own sake.  Teachers are attracted to 
charter schools because they view the concept as empowering them to practice their profession 
free of traditional constraints.  But teacher turnover is high.245 When they find the lure of teacher 
empowerment illusory they are likely to leave.  Mandating a vehicle for teacher involvement as a 
condition of the charter may reduce teacher turnover.  The reduction in turnover creates the 
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organizational stability necessary to form a professional community.  
Third, placing the burden on the school itself to develop its vehicle for teacher 
involvement will lead to experimentation with varying approaches.  Competition among the 
different approaches will test the comparative advantages of each.  Will teacher cooperative4s be 
more effective than teacher representation on the charter’s board of trustees?  Will teacher 
representation on the board be more effective than teacher-administration councils?  Will any of 
these approaches be more effective than new ones yet to be tried?  The competition among 
different approaches developed as a result of the charter mandate will answer these questions to 
the betterment of delivery of educational services. 
Finally, the development of successful models of teacher involvement will place 
competitive pressure on traditional public schools to do likewise.  The teacher union reform 
districts  demonstrate that meaningful teacher involvement can exist in spite of stifling legal 
doctrine.  Competitive pressures from high performance charter schools may force other 
traditional school districts to reexamine their labor relations systems and to move away from the 
industrial relations model to a high performance model.  District administrators and union 
officials will be forced to take risks and move outside their traditional roles.  In time, the success 
of such high performance educational workplaces may generate pressure to reform existing legal 
doctrine as it relates to teacher collective representation.  
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